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A Comparative Negligence Checklist
To Avoid Future Unnecessary
Litigation
By JOHN M. ROGERS* & RANDY DONALD SHAW**
INTRODUCTION

Systems of comparative negligence, whereby the negligence
of a plaintiff serves to reduce rather than to preclude tort recovery
in negligence, have been adopted in thirty-nine states.' The common law rule that contributory negligence is an absolute bar to
recovery is still the law in Kentucky,2 although modified by the
doctrine of "last clear chance." 3 Kentucky may soon join the
trend toward comparative negligence, however. In the last
legislative session, bills to adopt comparative negligence were introduced in both the House of Representatives4 and the Senate. 5
A hearing on this subject was held by the Interim Judiciary and
Civil Procedure Committee in March, 1983,6 and it is likely that
a comparative negligence bill will again be introduced in the 1984
session of the General Assembly. 7 Although most states have
"Associate Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky. B.A. 1970, Stanford Umversity; J.D. 1974, Umversity of Michigan.
J.D. Candidate 1984, Umversity of Kentucky.
See generally C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFr, COMPAATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §§
3.70-.580 (rev. 1978 & Supp. 1982)[heremafter cited as HEFr & HEFT] V SCHwARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 3.1-.5 (1974 & Supp. 1978); H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE:
COMPAPATIVE FAULT421-595 (1978), 159-250 (Cum.Supp. 1982). Both HEFr& HET and

H. WOODS contain up-to-date analyses of the comparative negligence laws of jurisdictions
which have adopted the system. For a table of state statutory enactments of comparative
negligence, see HEFr & HEFT, at 159 (Supp. 1982).
2 See, e.g., Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Ky. 1968); Peerless.Mfg.
Corp. v. Davenport, 136 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Ky. 1940); Mackey v. Greenview Hosp., Inc.,
587 S.W.2d 249, 257 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Vinson v. Gobrecht, 560 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977).
3 See notes 214-18 -nfra
and accompanying text.
4 See H.R. 480, 1982 Reg. Sess.
5 See S. 270, 1982 Reg. Sess.
6 Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the 1982-83 Interim Joint Committee on
Judiciary-Civil (March 15, 1983) (available at Legislative Research Commison, Frankfort,
Kentucky).
7 Telephone interview with Edith Schwab, Kentucky Legislative Research Commission Staff (May 27, 1983).
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adopted comparative negligence statutorily, a few have done so
by court decision.8 Kentucky courts will soon have the opportunity to adopt comparative negligence. The Kentucky Supreme
Court has recently granted discretionary review in a case m which
the only issue preserved for appeal is the denial of the plaintiff's
request for a comparative negligence instruction to the jury. 9
This Article will not attempt to assess the relative merits of
contributory and comparative negligence. 1° Presumably, those
issues will be aired thoroughly before the legislature and the courts.
However, many states which have decided either legislatively or
judicially to adopt comparative negligence have failed to resolve
in advance a number of accompanying issues. This failure has
resulted in extensive litigation to "fill the gaps."" Such litigation

8 See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar,
421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill.
1981); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich.
1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,
256 S.E.2d 879 (W Va. 1979).
9 See Hilen v. Hays, No. 82-CA-1238-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 20, 1983), petition
for discretionary rev. granted, No. 83-SC-458-DG (Ky. S. Ct. Oct. 5, 1983).
It is interesting to note that some opponents of comparative negligence argue to the
courts that adoption of comparative negligence should be left to the legislature, see, e.g.,
Appellee's Brief at 22-24, Bustle v. Kentucky Power Co., No. 83-CA-785, (Ky. Ct. App.
Sept. 24, 1983), while other opponents argue to the legislature that consideration of comparative negligence should be left to the courts. See, e.g., Comments by Larry Forgy,
Minutes of the SixthMeeting of the 1982-83 Interim Committee on Judiciary-Civil (March
15, 1983).
10 For helpful analyses of these two doctrines see HEFr & HEFr, supra note 1, at
§ 1.10; V ScmvA rz, supra note 1, at 1-29; Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 41 CALIF.
L. REv 1 (1953).
Of course, examining how to resolve difficulties inherent in the adoption of comparative negligence may influence the decision of whether to adopt comparative negligence
in the first place.
11 See. e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1239-41 (recognized the serious
problems arising under comparative negligence in multiple party litigation but chose not
to resolve them since the case did not involve a multiple party situation. Many of the problems raised were resolved in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899
(Cal. 1978)); Dominguez v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 388
N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (N.Y. 1979)(the court discussed, but left open, the question of whether
the doctrine of last clear chance survived New York's adoption of comparative negligence);
Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. 1978)("Oklahoma's very general comparative negligence statute is admittedly ambiguous in reference to situations involving
multiple parties such as we have here." The court attempted to resolve questions of contribution and joint and several liability left in the legislative void).
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can be avoided by anticipating issues likely to arise when the doctrine is adopted, and resolving the issues by careful statutory draf12
ting or considered judicial opinion.
This Article will examine several of the more important issues
that should be addressed when comparative negligence is adopted.
The issues to be discussed are: (1) how to apportion liability among
multiple tortfeasors; (2) whether to retain the doctrine of last clear
chance; (3) whether to permit setoff; and (4) what limits to put
on jury instructions.1 Reasonable alternatives for each Issue will
be set out, with possible statutory language for the adoption of
each alternative. The relative advantages and disadvantages of
each alternative will then be discussed in light of the current state
of Kentucky tort law, the underlying rationale for adopting comparative negligence, and the type of comparative negligence
system-pure or modified-adopted.
In a pure comparative negligence system, the plaintiff recovers
his damages, reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to
the plaintiff's negligence, regardless of whether the plaintiff's
negligence is deemed greater than defendant's. 4 In the majority
12

f a court adopts comparative negligence without the benefit of legislation, it is
perhaps of questionable propriety for the court at the same time to resolve subsidiary issues
not presented by the particular facts of the case. However, court resolution of such issues
at the time of adoption may not necessarily be mere dicta. Resolution of the subsidiary
issues may be theoretically necessary to determine whether comparative negligence should
be adopted by the court. One argument against judicial adoption of a comparative
negligence system is that such adoption would require a court to resolve a number of finely drawn, difficult legislative choices. A court could meet this argument by explaimng
how the resolution of many of these issues follows easily from a decision to adopt comparative negligence. The best proof that the issues may be easily resolved by the judiciary
is simply to resolve them in the opimon of the case adopting comparative negligence.
13Other issues, not discussed in this Article, also merit the attention of the
legislature or judiciary if comparative negligence is adopted. One issue is the extent to
which the adoption is retroactive. See generally V ScHWARAZ, supra note 1, at 141-51;
H. WOODS, supranote 1, at 347-56. Another issue is whether to extend comparative fault
to strict products liability. See, e.g., Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 51 U.S.L.W 2728 (InI. May
19, 1983). A third issue is the effect of comparative negligence on intentional torts. See
generally V ScHwARTZ, supra note 1, at 99-113; H. WOODS, supra note 1, at 159-70.
14See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d at 1049 ("Under a 'pure' form the plaintiff's damages
are simply reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence which is attributed to hun");
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1243 ("in all actions for negligence resulting in injury
to person or property, the contributory negligence of the person injured shall not bar
recovery, but the damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.").
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of modified comparative negligence systems, on the other hand,
the plaintiff may recover damages reduced by the percentage of
fault attributable to his own negligence, only when his negligence
is less than or equal to that of the defendant. But, if the plaintiff's
negligence is greater than the defendant's, the contributory
negligence bar applies and the plaintiff recovers nothing.15 The
minority of modified comparative negligence systems provide that
plaintiffs may recover only where their negligence is less than
defendant's. Under this system, a plaintiff found equally negligent
relative to the defendant is not entitled to damages.16
THE UNIFORm COMPARATIVE FAULT Aar provides a model statute for enactment of
pure comparative fault:
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury
or death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable
to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault,
but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law
the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded
under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.
UNIFORM CompmuATivE FAULT AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1982)[hereinafter cited as
UCFA].
15 This system is presently in effect in Connecticut, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin. See
generally H. WOODS, supra note 1, § 4:4, 20-21 (Supp. 1982).
For an example of a statutory adoption of tins form of modified comparative negligence
see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(a)(West Supp. 1983-84), which states:
In causes of action based on negligence contributory negligence shall
not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to
recover damages resulting from injury to persons or damage to property,
if the negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought. Any damages allowed shall
be diminished in the proportion of the percentage of negligence attributed
to the person recovering.
16 Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Utah, West Virginia and Wyoming have adopted such a system. See generally H. WOODS,
supra note 1, at § 4:3, 20 (Supp. 1982). For example, the Colorado statute provides:
Contributory negligence shallnot bar recovery in any action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but
any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage, or death
recovery is made.
COLO. REV STAT. § 13-21-111(1)(1973).
One other form of comparative negligence is followed in three jurisdictions which
have modified systems. This form is known as "slight-gross" and is in effect in Nebraska
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For the most part, the policies articulated in support of adoption of comparative negligence may be used to support either a
pure or a modified system.' 7 It is argued in support of comparative negligence that the demal of any recovery by contributory

negligence where the injured plaintiff is only partially at fault is
harsh, unfair and inconsistent with the compensatory purposes
of American tort law. 18 The underlying premise of this argument
is that responsibility should be distributed in proportion to
fault. 19 Further, presently available meaiis of mitigating the
harshness of the contributory negligence bar are argued to be unsatisfactory for various reasons. One such means, the "last clear
chance" doctrine, preserves the "all or nothing" result of contributory negligence, and has no sound logical foundation.2e
and South Dakota. In Nebraska a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery
when it is only "slight" in comparison to the defendant's "gross" negligence. In South Dakota,
the plaintiff's negligence does not bar recovery if it is "ordinary." See generally H. WOODS,
supra note 1, at § 4:5. Similarly, m Tennessee, if the plaintiffs contributory negligence
is "remote," it is not a bar to recovery. Id.
17 No attempt will be made to evaluate the relative merits of pure and modified
comparative negligence. For a discussion of the differing rationales, see Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 532 P.2d at 1242-43; UCFA commissioners; prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 35-36 (Supp.
1983); James Kalven, Keeton, Leflar, Malone and Wade, Comments on Maki v. FrelkemComparativev. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or LegislatureDecideP, 21
VA D. L. REv. 889, 910-11 (1968); Prosser, supra note 10, at 21-25. Of course, an evaluation of the subsidiary issues raised by the adoption of comparative negligence may assist
m determimng whether to adopt pure or modified comparative negligence. See text accompanying notes 27-53 infra for a discussion of a potentially difficult issue that does not
arise at all under pure comparative negligence, but has proved to be extremely troublesome
in modified jurisdictions.
18 See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1230 ("Although criticized almost
from the outset for the harshness of its operation, [the complete defense of contributory
negligence] has weathered numerous attacks.
The essence of that criticism has been
constant and dear: the doctrine is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute
responsibility in proportion to fault." (footnote omitted)); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d
at 436 ("today (contributory negligence] is almost universally regarded as unjust and inequitable
If fault is to remain the test of liability, then the doctrine of comparative
negligence which involves apportionment of the loss among those whose fault contributed
to the occurrence is more consistent with liability based on a fault premise."). See also
W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRs § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971)("The purpose
of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another." (footnote omitted)).
19 See note 18 supra. See also Miller, Extending the FairnessPrincipleof Li and
American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform ComparativeFaultAct, 14 PAc. L.J. 835,
845-46 (1983); Note, Comparative Negligence, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1668, 1670 (1981).
20 See text accompanying notes 213-18 tnfra.
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Reliance on the fact that juries already apparently apportion
liability between negligent plaintiffs and defendants2 is unsatisfactory since it tacitly approves jury defiance of the law. Finally, determining the plaintiffs standard of care,22 or whether
there is proximate cause,23 differently for the plaintiff than for
the defendant may mitigate the harshness of contributory
negligence, but is logically indefensible. The various alternatives
for the resolution of subsidiary issues must be evaluated against
the backdrop of these articulated reasons for the adoption of comparative negligence.
I.

APPORTIONING LIABILITY AMONG MULTIPLE TORTFEASOBS

Jurisdictions which have adopted comparative negligence have
been confronted with a number of issues where the plaintiff's injury is the result of the negligence of more than a single plaintiff
and single defendant. Resolving multiple party issues when comparative negligence is adopted by a court or legislature will avoid
subsequent litigation and inconsistent decisions in the lower courts.
The issues raised by multiple party litigation which most clearly
need such resolution are: (A) whether to compare the plaintiffs
negligence with each defendant individually or with the combined negligence of all the defendants; (B) whether to determine plaintiffs negligence with respect to all tortfeasors or only with respect
to joined parties; (C) how to treat settlement by one or more of
the joint tortfeasors; (D) whether comparative negligence should
eliminate joint and several liability; and (E) whether contribution should survive comparative negligence.2
21 See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1231 ("Every trial lawyer is well
aware that juries often do in fact allow recovery in cases of contributory negligence, and
that the compromise in the jury room does result in some discrimination of the damages
because of the plaintiff's fault." (quoting Prosser, supra note 10, at 4)); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So.2d at 437 (the court notes that contributory negligence is defended on the grounds
that it is not as harsh as it might be "because juries tend to disregard the instruction given

by the trial judge in an effort to afford some rough justice to the injured party").
22 See generally James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 723-24
(1952-53).
23 See generally id. at 726-27.
24 Other issues generated by multiple party litigation under comparative negligence
that will not be discussed here include those surrounding indemnity, principal-agent as
multiple parties, and negligent entrustment. For discussion of these issues, see generally

V ScHwARTz, supra note 1, at §§ 16.1, 16.9; H. WOODS, supra note 1, at §§ 13:11-:15.
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Whether to Compare Plaintiff's Negligence with Each
Defendant or with All Defendants' Joint Negligence

If Kentucky adopts a modified form of comparative
negligence,S it will be necessary in multiple defendant cases to
resolve whether plaintiffs negligence must be less than that of each
defendant, or merely less than that of all defendants together, in
order for the plaintiff to recover. Under the majority of modified
comparative negligence systems, the plaintiff is awarded damages,
reduced by the fault apportioned to him or her, only when the
defendant's negligence is greater than or equal to the plaintiffs.0
When there are multiple tortfeasors, a plaintiff could be found
to be more negligent than some tortfeasors and equally or less
negligent than others. Situations will also arise where a plaintiff
is found to be less than fifty percent negligent, but more negligent
than each defendant individually. z* The questions these situations raise are: (1) whether the plaintiff whose negligence is less
than the combined negligence of all the other tortfeasors should
be barred from compensation for injuries caused by those defendants found to be proportionally less negligent than the plaintiff;
or (2) whether such a plaintiff may be permitted recovery against
all the torifeasors because his negligence was not greater than that
of all the torifeasors combined.
Jurisdictions which have considered this issue have resolved
it in different ways. Some states have specifically provided in their
comparative negligence statutes that the plaintiffs negligence must
be compared to the combined negligence of all the defendants.28
25 See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text for the distinction between pure
and modified comparative negligence. The comparative fault bill introduced in the 1982

Session of the Kentucky House of Representatives was a modified system. SeeH.R. 480,
1982 Reg. Sess.

2 See note 15 supra and accompanying text. For discussions of the various types
of modified comparative negligence, see generally V SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 3:5 at
73-78; H. WOODS, supra note 1, at 82-86.

Some states with modified comparative negligence only allow recovery where defendant's negligence is greater than plaintiff's. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
*7 For example, the jury finds P 40% negligent, D 1 30% negligent and D2 30%

negligent. P is more negligent than either DI or D2 but less than 50 % at fault for the
resulting injuries.
28 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(a)(West Supp. 1983-84); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 231, § 85 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1979); N.J. STAT.
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Jurisdictions which have decided the issue judicially, due to ambiguous statutes, are divided about evenly on the issue. Some courts
have followed the approach taken originally by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,29
that under modified comparative negligence the plaintiff's
negligence must be less than a particular defendant's for the plaintiff to be awarded damages against that defendant.3o The opANN. 2A.15-5.1 (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. BEv. STAT. § 18.470 (1979); TEx. REy Cr.
STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp.

1983). The Connecticut, New Jersey, Oregon and Vermont statutes contain the clearest
provisions directing that the plaintiff's degree of negligence or fault be compared with
the combined negligence of the defendants. The pertinent portion of the Connecticut statute
states that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff does not bar recovery "if the negligence
was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom
recovery is sought." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(a). See note 15 suprafor the complete text of this statute. The wording of the Oregon statute is different only in that it
expresses the comparison in terms of "fault" instead of "negligence." OR. REv. STAT. §
18.470.

Depending upon whether Kentucky adopts comparative "fault" or comparative
"negligence," either the Connecticut or Oregon statute provides an excellent model for
a statute designed to mandate comparison of the plaintiff's negligence to that of the combined defendants. The Massachusetts, Nevada and Texas statutes would not be good models
since they do not expressly call for combimng the defendants' negligence and thus could
create confusion.
29 252 N.W 721 (Wis. 1934), cited with approval in Wisconsin Natural Gas v.
Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 291 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. 1980)(interpreting Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983)).
30 Walker v. Kroger Grocery, 252 N.W at 727-28. See also Mishoe v. Davis, 14
S.E.2d 187, 193 (Ga. 1941)("No plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against a tortfeasor
to whose negligence plaintiffs negligence is equal."); Odenwalt v. Zaring, 624 P.2d 383
(Idaho 1980) (interpreting IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979)); Maner v. Memorial Rescue Serv.,
Inc., 207 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1972)(plaintiff and two defendants were all found to be
33-1/3% negligent, and thus plaintiff could not recover under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01
(1973)). The Minnesota statute in Marler, as amended in 1978, now allows recovery if
the plaintiffs contributory negligence is not greater than the defendant's. This amendment would change the result of this case but the language requiring comparison of plaintiff's
negligence with each defendants' was retained.) Van Horn v. William Blanchard Co.,
438 A.2d 552 (N.J. 1981)(interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.1 (West 1973)). Van Horn
was overturned statutorily in 1982 by N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp.
1983-84)(wluch provides for comparison of the plaintiffs negligence with the conbmed
negligence of all the defendants); Stannard v. Hams, 380 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1977) (interpreting
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 1036 (1973). Stannard was overturned statutorily in 1979 when
the legislature added language making it clear that plaintiffs' negligence should be compared with the total negligence of all defendants. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1036 (Supp.
1982); Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1981)(interpreting
WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977)).
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posite result was first reached by the Supreme Court of Arkansas
in Walton v. Tull,3' where the court held that the statute in
question 32 should be interpreted to allow recovery by the plaintiff against all defendants when the plaintiff's negligence was less
than fifty percent, regardless of the fact that one defendant was
found no more negligent than the plaintiff.34 Since Walton, a
number of other jurisdictions have held that it is the combined
negligence of the defendants which is compared to plaintiff's
negligence in determining whether plaintiff's contributory
negligence bars recovery against an individual defendant.s
When Walker and Walton were decided the comparative
negligence statutes of both states required comparison of the plaintiff's negligence with that of the person against whom recovery
is sought.ss Yet the Wisconsin court held this to mean that if
plaintiff's negligence was greater than one of the tortfeasor's he
or she could not recover from that party, 37 while the Arkansas
court found that such a result was unjust and did not represent
basic legislative intent in adopting comparative negligence. 3s
The rationale underlying the Wisconsin approach is that in
adopting modified comparative negligence, as opposed to the pure
form, 39 the legislature intended to prevent plaintiffs from
recovering from defendants who are less negliglent. 4° In addi3' 356 S.W.2d 20 (Ark. 1962).
32 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962) repealed by ARK. STAT. ANN. g 27-1764

(1979), which removes the prior ambiguity by specifying that plaintiff's negligence must
be compared to that of the party or parties against whom recovery is sought.
'3 356 S.W.2d at 25-27.
34 Id. at 26.
35 E.g., Negley v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 625 P.2d 472 (Kan. 1981)(interpreting
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976)); Graci v. Damon, 374 N.E.2d 311, 316-18 (Mass. App.
Ct.), affd, 383 N.E.2d 842 (Mass. 1978)(interpreting MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231 § 85
(Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1983)). The court emphasized that in 1973 the legislature

amended the phrase "person against whom recovery is sought" to "person or persons against
whom recovery is sought." Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1072 n.2 (Okla.
1978) (interpreting Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23 § 13 (West Supp. 1982-83) which the court
determined was patterned after the Arkansas statute)).
36 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962)(as set out so Walton v. Tull, 356 S.W.2d
at 27); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
37
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 252 N.W at 727-28.
38 Walton v. Tull, 356 S.W.2d at 26.
39 See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text for a comparison of pure and

modified comparative negligence.

4o See V ScsiwARTz, supra note 1, § 16:16, at 257.
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tion, in jurisdictions allowing defendants to be held jointly and
severally liable,'41 the Wisconsin rule prevents defendants who
are only at fault by a relatively small percentage from being liable
for the plaintiffs entire award.42 In contrast, the Arkansas court
reasoned that the purposes behind adopting comparative
negligence were basically to enforce fair apportionment of damages
with relative fault and to abrogate the harsh results of contributory
negligence,43 and that these purposes would be undermined by
following the Wisconsin rule.44 The unfair harshness of contributory negligence reappears when a plaintiffs ability to recover
for injuries is put in jeopardy merely because the incident involved multiple tortfeasors. 45 Also, a plaintiff involved in an action
against multiple tortfeasors would be discouraged from joining
all the potentially culpable participants since the chances of obtaimng full recovery lessen as more defendants are joined. 4" Since
the only reasonable way to apportion liability fairly among multiple tortfeasors is to bnng them all before the court for determination of their proportionate negligence,47 a rule that potentially
punishes plaintiffs for joining all tortfeasors obstructs one of the
primary goals of comparative negligence, that of fairly apportioning damages among all persons responsible for an injury.
If Kentucky adopts modified comparative negligence statutorily, the legislature should specifically choose either the Wisconsin
or Arkansas approach in the language of the statute. For example, if the intention in adopting a modified form of comparative
negligence is to preclude recovery by a claimant from a person
less negligent than the claimant, then a statute such as the cur-

41

See notes 132-35 tnfra and accompanying text.

42 See V ScHWAlTz, supra note 1, § 16:6, at 257.

'3 See Walton v. Tull, 356 S.W.2d at 26.
44 Id. See also V SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 16:6, at 259.
4For

example, if in one tortious occurrence P is found 40% negligent and D is

60% negligent, P will recover 60% of the damages. But if the same occurrence involved
multiple tortfeasors and P was 40% negligent, D1 30% and D 2 30%, P would recover

nothing. See V ScHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 259. See also Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d
1071, 1073 (Okla. 1978).
46 For example, m the situation described m note 45 supra, P would probably stand
a greater chance of recovery by joinng only D I or D. See Note, supra note 19, at 1674.
47 See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 503-04 (1953).
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rent Wisconsin law would make a useful model.A But if modified comparative negligence were selected merely to prevent
recovery to plaintiffs who are more than fifty percent responsible
for their injuries, then a statute
such as the present one in Con49
necticut should be adopted.
If a system of modified comparative negligence is adopted in
which the plaintiff cannot recover from a defendant less negligent
than the plaintiff, and in which the plaintiff's negligence is compared to each defendant's negligence, the question arises as to
whether the burden of eliminating the share apportioned to a
defendant less negligent than the plaintiff should fall entirely on
the plaintiff, entirely on the other defendants, or be distributed
equally among all the remaimng parties.5 At least one comparative negligence statute has been drafted to address this issue
and places the burden completely on the other defendants. 51 One
§ 895.045 (West 1983) which states:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or m injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater
than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.
(emphasis added).
Insertion of the word "individual" before the phrase "negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought" would help to insure avoidance of the Arkansas result on similar
language. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
49 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(a)(West Supp. 1983-84). See note 15 supra
for the text of this statute.
50 For example, if P is found 20 % negligent, D, 10 %, D 2 30 % and D3 40 %, the
question arises as to who absorbs the loss of Di's share. For a discussion of this example,
see Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative FaultLaws-An Analysts of
the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REv 342, 357-58 (1980).
51 N.H. REV STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1979) which states, in pertinent part:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any plaintiff, or his legal representative, to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death, personal injury, or property damage, if such negligence was not
greater than the causal negligence of the defendant, but the damages awarded
shall be diminished, by general verdict, in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributed to the plaintiff; provided that where recovery is allowed
against more than one defendant, each such defendant shall be liable for
that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio
of the amount of his causalnegligence to the amount of causal negligence
attributedto all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.
(emphasis added).
48 WIS. STAT. ANN.
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commentator has pointed out that this solution is inconsistent with
the rationale for adopting comparative negligence, that of apportiomng loss according to relative fault, and that a fairer result
would be obtained by distributing the deleted share among all parties to the action, including the plaintiff.52 Since this question
will certainly arise where modified comparative negligence of the
type that compares plaintiff's negligence with each defendant's
is adopted, it should be anticipated and clarified in the enacting
legislation.0
B.

Whether to Determne Plaintiffs Negligence with Respect
to All Tortfeasors or Only Partiesto an Action

Once the problem of comparing plaintiffs negligence to either
the individual or combined negligence of multiple defendants is
resolved, the problem of whether to consider the negligence of
tortfeasors not joined as parties in formulating the apportionment
of damages still remains. Some states have dealt with this issue
statutorily.54 In states where either the statutes were sufficiently

52 See Pearson, supra note 50, at 357-58.

53 The New Hampshire statute quoted in note 51 supra, is illustrative of one approach which may be followed to clarify this issue in advance. To reach a different result
this statute could sunply be modified thus:
provided that where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant,
each such defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar
amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal
negligence to the amount of the causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is sought.
It should be noted that this model contemplates that the liability of joint tortfeasors is several.
4Some of the states having pure comparative negligence statutes use the negligence
of all negligent participantsin determimng plaintiffs proportionate negligence. See, e.g.,
LA. CODE CIv Paoc. ANN. art. 1811(B)(2)(West Supp. 1983)(see Pearson, supra note 50,
at 355 n.49 for further clarification of this statute); N.Y. Civ PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976) ("damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which
the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant bears to the culpable conduct which
caused the damages." (emphasis added)).
Other states have statutes that are ambiguous, see, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1972); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1982). At least one state has a statute which seems
to call for consideration only of the fault of parties to the action. See WASH. REV CODE
shall involve consideration of both
ANN. § 4.22.015 (1981)("A comparison of fault
the nature of the conduct of the partiesto the action and the extent of the causal relation
between such conduct and the damages." (emphasis added)).
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ambiguous or comparative negligence was adopted judicially in

the first instance, resolution has come from the courts.
This issue arises under both modified and pure comparative

negligence systems. In adopting pure comparative negligence
judicially, the Califorma Supreme Court, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.

of California,55noted that if multiple persons are involved in an
occurrence involving negligence, and not all of those persons are
before the court, it is difficult for the jury to evaluate the propor:

tionate negligence of all participants in the occurrence. 6 The
court also noted that such an evaluation would not be res judicata
in a subsequent action against a torifeasor not joined in the first
actionY5 Despite a recognition of these concerns, the California
court, in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court of
Los Angeless [hereinafter AMA], later held that in order to
determine plaintiffs proportionate negligence the plaintiff's
negligence must be compared to that of all tortfeasors whether
or not they are parties to the suit.59 In so holding, the California

court followed what is often referred to as the "Wisconsin
rule."' ' The reasoning underlying adoption of this rule in
Wisconsin was that the statutory language called for diminishing
Of the modified comparative negligence states, some jurisdictions have statutes expressly requiring determination of the plaintiff's proportionate share in relation only to
parties to the action. See e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231 § 85 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp.
1983) ("In determining by what amount the plaintiff's damages shall be diminished in such
a case, the negligence of each plaintiff shall be compared to the total negligence of all
persons againstwhom recovery is sought." (emphasis added)). See also HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 663-31 (1976).
s5 532 P.2d at 1226.
56 Id. at 1239-40.
57 Id. A similar concern is expressed in UCFA § 2 commissioners' comment, 12
U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1983). The court in Lz did not resolve this issue since multiple parties
were not involved. 532 P.2d at 1241.
58 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978).
5'Id. at 906 n.2.
60 This view was first expressed in Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 252
N.W 721, 727-28 (Wis. 1934). For other jurisdictions adopting this view, see also Paul
v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1980)("To limit the jury to viewing the
negligence of only one tortfeasor and then ask it to apportion that negligence to the overall
wrong is to ask it to judge a forest by observing just one tree.", Bowman v. Barnes, 282
S.E.2d 613, 619-21 (W Va. 1981)). West Virgima had already adopted comparative
negligence judicially in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W Va. 1979),
but this case left some ambiguity as to whether to consider all tortfeasors or only parties.
See Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d at 619.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 72

the plaintiffs recovery proportionally to his or her own
negligence6i and, therefore, "the causal negligence of all of the
other participants in the transaction must be deemed to constitute
the other term of the proportion."6 2 To limit this part of the proportion to consideration of only joined parties would serve to allow
the negligence of a non-joined participant to be allocated to some
other participant, thus altering the proportion attributed to the
plaintiff in a way contrary to the intent of the statute.6 3 In those
states which have reached the result of the "Wisconsin rule"
without statututory direction,6 the underlying rationale is that
the predominant determination is the proportion of the plaintiffs
negligence, and this can only be logically and fairly ascertained
by considering the actions of all participants in an event. " Even
where statutory language has expressly called for comparing plaintiff's negligence with that of all parties against whom recovery
is sought, 66 courts have held that the legislative intent was to require comparison of plaintiffs negligence to that of all participants
in a tortious event.67 Such a stretching of statutory language em-

phasizes the need for drafting comparative negligence legislation
to mandate legislative intent unequivocally. 68
61 See note 48 supra for the language of the Wisconsin Statute.
62 Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 252 N.W at 727.
63Id.

64 See, e.g., AMA, 578 P.2d at 906 n.2; Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d at 619-21.
6 See 578 P.2d at 906 n.2 ("In determining to what degree the injury was due to
the fault of the plaintiff, it is logically essential that the plaintiffs negligence be weighed
against the combined total of all other causative negligence
"); Pocatello Indus. Park
Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399, 403 (Idgho 1980). See also Comment, Illinois ComparativeNegligence: Multiple Parties,Multiple Problems, 1982 S. ILL. U. L.J. 89, 94-96.
See generally HEFT & HEFt, note 1, supra, at § 8.131.
66 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976).
67 See Brown v. Kefll, 580 P.2d 867, 876 (Kan. 1978)("[W]e conclude the intent
and purpose of the legislature in adopting K.S.A. 60-258a was to impose individual liability

for damages based on the proportionate fault of all parties to the occurrence which gave
rise to the injuries."). See also Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip, Inc., 437 F Supp.
707, 712 (D. Kan. 1977); Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d at 403
("true apportionment cannot be achieved unless that apportionment includes all tortfeasors
guilty of causal negligence
whether or not they are parties to the case") (quoting Hm
& HEFr,supra note 1, at § 8.131); Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 902-03 (Minn. 1978).
See generally HEFr & HEFT, supra note 1, at § 8.131.
68 Cf. Comment, Brown and Miles: At Last, an End to Ambiguity in the Kansas
Law of Comparative Negligence, 27 KAN. L. REv. 111, 117 (1978):
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An opposite approach to the Wisconsin rule has been embodied
in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) section 2(a)(2),
which limits determination of relative fault to those individuals
who are parties to an action or who have obtained releases.69
The drafters of this rule listed three reasons for its adoption: (1)
ascertaimng the relative fault of a non-party and knowing whether
a non-party will ever be held accountable for any negligent acts
is impossible; (2) any adjudication of relative negligence would
not be binding in subsequent suits; and (3) joinder of as many tortfeasors as possible will be encouraged since the proportionate
negligence of plaintiff and each defendant will decrease with each
negligent party joined, and the likelihood of a plaintiff selectively joining defendants is diminished where the negligence of a nonparty could partially or entirely be attributed to the plaintiff. 7°
Although some authorities have expressed agreement with the logic
of the first two of these three reasons, 71 or have recommended72
adoption of the UCFA in this regard based on other arguments,
relatively few states have adopted this approach either statutorily"3 or judicially. 74
Since a central purpose in adopting comparative negligence
is to apportion responsibility fairly according to the relative fault
of the parties involved, the resolution of this issue depends on
Both the Brown court and the Greenwood court have linguistic difficulties in explaining the consideration of an absent tortfeasor (traditionally speaking, a non-party)
as a party solely for the limited purpose of determining and allocating all causal negligence
because paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 60-258a specifically refer to persons being joined
as 'parties.'
Id.
69 See UCFA § 2(a)(2) & commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1983).
70 See UCFA commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 39. These are basically the same
concerns expressed by the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
at 1239-40. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text. For a criticism of the rationale
underlying UCFA § 2(a)(2), see Comment, supra note 65, at 94-96.
71 See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1239-40. See also H. WOODS, supra note
1, § 13:3, at 224-25; Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-75, 64 CALIF. L.
Rrv. 239, 258 (1976).
72 See Pearson, supra note 50, at 364-65.
73 See note 54 supra.
74 See HEFr & HEFT, supra note 1, § 8.131 at n.1. See also Blocker v. Wynn, 425
So. 2d 166, 168-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Davis v. Lewis, 331 So. 2d 320, 323 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert denied, 348 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1977); Pocatello Indus. Park v.
Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d at 403.
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whether any unfairness that might occur as a result of consideration of a non-party's negligence is outweighed by the enhancement of fair apportionment resulting from considering the actions
of all negligent participants. In adopting comparative negligence
the Kentucky courts or legislature should consider the relative
merits of these countervailing interests. If it is determined that
it would be unduly detrimental to the interests of fairness to consider the negligence of persons not before the court, the language
used by the UCFA75 or the current Massachusetts statute76 could
serve as model legislation. On the other hand, if it is thought that
fair apportionment requires consideration of the negligence of all
persons involved in the occurrence, the New York comparative
negligence statute 77 provides a suitable model.
C.

Effect of Settlement by a Joint Tortfeasor

Regardless of whether a non-party's negligence is considered
in determining the plaintiff's proportionate negligence, there still
remains the issue of how to treat apportionment of damages when
one or more of the persons causing the injuries has settled with
the claimant. Three questions must be resolved when there has
been such a settlement: (1) whether the settlement between the
claimant and settlor is final or whether the settlor can be held liable
75 UCFA § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 39 states that the factfinder shall determine "the
percentage of the total fault-of all the parties to each claim that is allocated to each clai-

mant, defendant, tlurd-party defendant, and person who has been released from liability."
76

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231 § 85 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1983) states, in perti-

nent part: "In determining by what amount the plaintiffs damages shall be diminished
in such a case, the negligence of each plaintiff shall be compared to the total negligence

of all persons against whom recovery is sought."
77 N.Y. Civ PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976) states:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant
or to the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk,

shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable
shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable
to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the
damages.
The language could be further clarified by rephrasing the last sentence: "the culpable (or
negligent) conduct of all participants in the transaction or occurrence, whether parties
to the action or not, which caused the damages." It should be noted that this sample mandates a pure form of comparative negligence.
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for further damages should his or her proportionate share be deter-

mined in subsequent litigation to be greater than the value of the
settlement; (2) how to apportion the loss of the difference between
the value of the settlement and the settlor's proportionate share
should such settlement be less than the settlor's proportionate share;
and (3) how to consider the negligence of a settling torifeasor in
determining the defendants' proportionate shares7 8
1.

Whether There Should Be Contribution
Against TortJeasors Who Have Settled

Basically two approaches have been followed regarding contribution between nonsettling and settling tortfeasors and the ability to limit liability to the amount of the settlement. The first approach is embodied in the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 79 (1939 UCATA). Under this version
of the Act, a released joint tortfeasor remained subject to contribution for the difference between the settlement amount and his or
her pro rata share, provided the settlement was for less than this
share. 0 However, the settlor could avoid contribution if the
release stipulated that the damages awarded against the nonsetling tortfeasors would be reduced by the settlor's pro rata
share.8' Because subjecting a settling tortfeasor to contribution
78 See generally Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California
Legislatureon Tort Liability on the ProblemsAssociatedwith American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1464, 1494-98 (1979); Note, Settlement in joint
Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. BEv. 486 (1966); Comment, Ohio's Comparative Negligence
Statute: The Effect of Joint and Several Liability, Absent Defendantsand joinder, 50 U.
CiNN. L. REv. 342, 356-58-(1981).
79 1939 UNIFORM CONTRIBuTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 5 [hereinafter cited as
1939 UCATA],
12 U.L.A. 58 (1975).
80
Id.
81 See ud. Thus the nonsettling defendants achieve the eqivalent of contribution
at the expense of the plaintiff or the settlor. For example, P sues D1 , D2 and D3 and setties with D I before trial for $10,000. If the jury determines P's injury to be worth $36,000,
either D I is liable to the remaimng two defendants for $2,000 each ($12,000 minus
$10,000), or, if the release so specifies, D1 is free from contribution, but P's award is reduced by $12,000. Either way, the unreleased defendants are liable for no more than their
pro rata shares.
The 1939 UCATA also contains an optional provision providing that the relative
degrees of fault of joint tortfeasors may be considered in determimng pro rata shares. See
notes 188-91 infra and accompanying text.
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and reducing the plaintiffs recovery by the settlor's pro rata share
regardless of the amount of settlement provided a strong disincentive to settlement,2 only three states have adopted the 1939 Act
in its entirety. 3
In response to the resistance met by the 1939 UCATA, the commissioners amended the Act in 1955 (1955 UCATA) to provide
for discharge of a tortfeasor from contribution when a release or
covenant not to sue is received in good faith. 4 This version has
been accepted more widely, having been adopted in many
states,w including Califorma.8
The 1955 UCATA does not adapt well to a comparative
negligence system since it provides for contribution on a pro rata
basis rather than on the basis of fault proportion.8 7 Moreover,
82

See note 81 supra. Either the plaintiff or the settlor individually suffered the full
financial consequences of a low settlement. One of them was forced to make up the difference between the amount of settlement and the pro rata share attributable to each joint
tortfeasor. See also 1955 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACr § 4 commissioners' comment [hereinafter cited as 1955 UCATA], 12 U.L.A. 99 (1975); Fleming, supra
note 78, at 1494-95.
M The 1939 Act was adopted only in Arkansas, Hawaii and South Dakota. See 1955
UCATA commissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 59 (1975). See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1005 (1962).
84 1955 UCATA § 4 and commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 98, 99-100 (1975).
85 For a table of states that have enacted one or the other versions of UCATA, see
12 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 1983).

8 Califorma is not listed in the table cited in note 85 supra, but it substantially
CODE§§ 875-80 (West 1980). The
section dealing with settlement is virtually identical to the 1955 UCATA. Compare CAL.
Civ. PRo. CODE § 877 (West 1980) with 1955 UCATA § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
87 See 1955 UCATA §§ l(b), 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 63, 87 (1975). Thus, a state enacting
comparative negliglence without repealing an existing statute based on the 1955 UCATA
would create a situation where juries were called upon to apportion damages according
to the party's relative degree of fault, but contribution would be limited to a tortfeasor's
pro rata share. This result occurs in some comparative negligence states that have adopted
the UCATA. See, e.g., Graci v. Damon, 374 N.E.2d 311, 317 (Mass. App. Ct.), affd
383 N.E.2d 842 (Mass. 1978)("the negligence of a plaintiff is to be compared with the
total negligence of all the defendants, all of whom are liable to the plaintiff, with contribution among the joint tortfeasors on a pro rata basis"); Celotex Corp. v. Campbell
Roofing & Metal Works, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Miss. 1977). This situation has also
caused some jurisdictions to go to mampulative extremes to avoid this outcome. See Miller,
supra note 19, at 846-48.
For a discussion of joint and several liability under comparative negligence see notes
130-76 tnfra and accompanying text. For a discussion of contribution outside the context
of settlement, see notes 177-212 mifra and accompanying text.

enacted the 1955 UCATA in 1958. See CAL. Civ PIo.
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permitting a joint torfeasor to avoid payment of contribution
through agreement with the plaintiff may result in collusion.88

Finally, "good faith" may be difficult to ascertain and its adoption as a standard may result in unnecessary litigation. 89
The UCFA attempts to synthesize the best features of the 1939

and 1955 versions of the UCATA. It follows the 1955 UCATA by
providing that a release discharges a joint tortfeasor from contribu-

tion, but resembles the 1939 UCATA in reducing the plaintiffs
recovery by the settling tortfeasor's proportionateshare of fault. ®

Although this somewhat reduces the plaintiffs incentive to settle
by placing the entire burden of a low settlement upon him or her,
it has been justified as preserving the fair apportionment principles
of comparative fault. 91

2.

How to Apportion a Loss to Plaintiff
Due to a Low Settlement

If the 1939 UCATA approach is adopted, the settling tortfeasor, assuming his solvency, usually must make up the difference
between his settlement and his greater proportionate share of the
damages by contribution to the nonsettling tortfeasors. Under the
system provided in the UCFA, however, the settling tortfeasor gets
the benefit of his or her bargain and the difference must be borne
by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff's damages are reduced by the
88 See 1955 UCATA § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975). But cf. UCATA commissioners
comment, 12 U.L.A. 99 ("The requirement that the release or convenant be given m good
faith gives the court occasion to determine whether the transaction was Collusive and if
so there is no discharge.").
89 See id., Note, supra note 19, at 1695.
go See UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1983) which provides:
A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by
a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for
contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same
claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against
other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable
share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.
Compare1939 UCATA § 5, 12 U.L.A. 58 (1975) with 1955 UCATA § 4A, 12 U.L.A. 98
(1975).
91 See UCFA § 6 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1983). Of course,
this rule only provides fair apportionment among the defendants. Plaintiffs will ultimately have their damages reduced by more than their proportionate share.
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amount of a settlement, regardless of the settlor's proportionate
share of fault, and no right of contribution exists between settling and nonsettling tortfeasors, the burden of a low settlement
falls directly on the nonsettling tortfeasors, who end up being liable
for more than their proportionate shares. Requiring the nonsettling tortfeasors to bear the burden of a low settlement encourages
settlements, of course, but it would not be consistent with the principle of allocating liability according to fault. The UCFA shifts
the burden to the plaintiff by reducing plaintiff's award by the
settlor's proportionate share regardless of the amount of the
settlement.92 The UCFA approach is a reasonable one. The setfling defendant is not subject to contribution and thus is inclined
to pursue an out of court solution. Any disincentive engendered
by virtue of a reduction of the plaintiff's award by the settlor's
proportionate share is mitigated by the fact that a plaintiff who
negotiates a generous settlement will be able to retain the
benefits. 93 The plaintiff is in control of any risk inherent in
allowing a defendant to buy his or her peace since the plaintiff
can refuse a low settlement offer. 94 Finally, the UCFA approach
negates any incentive for a collusive settlement for less than a
reasonable amount between the plaintiff and a tortfeasor. 95
3. How to Consider the Negligence of Settling Tortfeasors
in Determining ProportionateNegligence
of Other Defendants
A third issue raised by settlement in multiparty situations is
how to consider the settlor's proportionate negligence in determining the nonsettling defendants' relative degree of fault. One
approach to this question was enunciated by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Pierringerv. Hoger.9 The court decided the
issue by calculating the percentage of causal negligence attributable
92 See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra. See also Pearson, supranote 50, at 371.
0 Under the UCFA the plaintiff's damages are reduced only by the value of the
proportionate share attributed to settling torifeasors, which if less than the amount of the
settlement, results m no penalty to the plaintiff. See note 90 supra for the text of UCFA § 6.
9' See Fleming, supra note 78, at 1496; Miller, supra note 19, at 865-66.
95 See Fleming, supra note 78, at 1496; Miller, supra note 19, at 865-66.
9 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963).
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to the nonsetfling defendant, concluding that this percentage could

not be appropriately determined without allocating the proportionate negligence of all tortfeasors and the plaintiff.97 The court
further held that the settling tortfeasors need not be joined as parties in order for the jury to apportion their negligence.98 This
solution has been adopted in at least two other states.99 UCFA
sections 2(a)(2) and (6), when read together, also provide for the
consideration of a released party's fault in apportioning damages
between joint torffeasors. 1°0
A different approach has been taken in Arkansas, where the
courts have ruled that the 1939 UCATA, as adopted there, 0'
gives nonsettling tortfeasors the right to bring in settling tortfeasors
as third party defendants in order to apportion fault among all
torifeasors, even when the plaintiff has dismissed the settlors from
the suit. 0 2 One commentator has suggested that the Arkansas approach is preferable because the Wisconsin rule has proven to be
difficult to apply and it is unreasonable to expect juries to be able
to apportion the fault of tortfeasors who are not before the
court. 1°0 The Arkansas approach would not work very well if setfling tortfeasors are not subject to contribution, however, since
they will have no incentive to defend the third party claim. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 14.0114 would not allow

97 Id. at 111-12.

Id. at Ill.
99 See Frey v. Sneigrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978)("In almost every case
the trial court should submit to the jury the fault of all parties, including the settling defendants, even though they have been dismissed from the lawsuit."); Bartels v. City of Williston,
276 N.W.2d 113, 119 (N.D. 1979)(adopting verbatim the holding in Pierrmnger).
101 See UCFA §§ 2(a)(2), (6), 12 U.L.A. 39, 44.
101 See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 34-1007(1)-(5)(1962)(adopts 1939 UCATA § 7).
102 See Giem v. Williams, 222 S.W.2d 800 (Ark. 1949). In Giem, the court held that
the defendants had the right, under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1007, to jiot a settling tortfeasor as a third party defendant even though the plaintiff had dismissed the action as
to him. Because they did not exercise this right, the defendants could only rely on the
reduction of damages due to settlement provisions of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1004 (1962).
But since the jury had been told of the settlement and knew of its amount, the court concluded that the jury must have considered the settlement in awarding plaintiffs damages
and no reduction was allowed. 222 S.W.2d at 804-05.
103 See H. WOODS, supra note 1, at 224-25.
104 KY. R. Civ. P. 14.01 [hereinafter cited as CR] governs when a defendant may
bring in a third party.
98
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third party claims against persons previously released by the plaintiff for purposes of apportionment of fault if contribution were
not allowed against the settlor-third-party-defendant. CR 14.01
only allows assertion of a claim by a defendant against a person
who is not a party to the action (this includes the situation where
a plaintiff has dismissed a released individual) and who might be
liable to the defendant for all or part of any damages awarded
to the plaintiff against the defendant.i1 5 If contribution is not
allowed between nonsettling and settling tortfeasors, then a settling tortfeasor cannot be liable to the defendant for any part of
the plaintiff's award and cannot be brought in as a third party
defendant. Thus, while the Arkansas approach is preferable if contribution against settling tortfeasors is permitted, where such contribution is not permitted, as under the UCFA, joinder of settling
parties solely for the purpose of determining apportionment of fault
should not be required.106
4.

Kentucky Settlement Law and ComparativeNegligence

Two Kentucky statutes now govern apportionment and contribution among joint tortfeasors. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
section 454.040,107 allows jurors the option of apportioning
damages among joint tortfeasors in relation to the percentage of

105 Id. CR 14.01 provides: "A defendant may move for leave as a third-party plaintiff to assert a claim against a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable
to hun for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."
106 Although the UCFA does not clearly require that a released individual be joined as a third party defendant in order to apportion his or her fault, the commissioners"

comment to UCFA § 2, expresses both the need for a state to allow parties to be brought
m as third party defendants and a strong preference for only determining the relative fault
of those actually joined as parties.
107 KY. REV. STAT. § 454.040 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS] states:
In actions of trespass the jury may assess joint or several damages against
the defendants. When the jury finds several damages, the judgment shall
be in favor of the plaintiff against each defendant for the several damages,

without regard to the amount of damages claimed in the petition, and shall
include joint judgment for the costs.
Even though the statute refers to actions of trespass, "[f]rom time immemorial it has been

held applicable to personal injury actions based on negligence." Orr v. Coleman, 455
S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970)(citing Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 224 S.W.2d
165, 168 (Ky. 1949)).
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causation attributed to each. 1i°0 Although the language of the
statute is permissive, 1' ° some authorities have suggested that the

jury should apportion damages among multiple defendants.1 0
The fact that one or more torfeasors have settled does not affect
the power of the jury to apportion damages between the settling
and nonsettling torifeasors."' When the jury so apportions,
liability will no longer be joint and several among defendants and
no defendant will be required to pay more than his or her proportionate share.12 Further, where there are both settling and
nonsettling tortfeasors, and the jury has apportioned damages
among them, the nonsettling torifeasors are liable for their proportionate share regardless of the amount of any settlement."'

108 See Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 536 (Ky. 1974); Ohio River Pipeline Corp.

v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (citing S.W Corum Hauling, Inc.
v. Tilford, 511 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Ky 1974)). See also Germain, Remedies: Contribution
and Apportionment Among "Joint Tortfeasors", 65 Ky. L.J. 285, 291-94 (1976-77).
An interesting question is whether a judge sitting as factfinder without a jury can
apportion damages. Although the literal words of the statute indicate only "juries" may
apportion, one court has held to the contrary. See Ohio River Pipeline Corp. v. Landrum,
580 S.W.2d at 717. See also Germain, supra, at 291-92.
109 The word "may" is used in KRS § 454.040. KRS § 446.010(20)(Michie Supp.
1982) provides: "[a]s used in the statute laws of this state, unless the context requires other'may' is permissive."
wise:
110 See Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 61 ("The practical answer is that the jury
should be requiredto assess the total amount of the claimant's damages and fix the proportionate share of the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability on the basis of his contribution
to the causation." (emphasis added)). See also D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 569 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Ky. 1978)(citing with approval Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d
at 61); Park, Comparative Negligence is Here Now?, KY. BENCH & BAR, Jan., 1975, at
18, 21. Judge Park writes, "Mhis writer suggests that the jury should be required to determine and apportion the percentage of causation in every case in which the jury has determined that a plaintiff is entitled to recover as a result of joint negligence." Id. This suggestion has not been followed. See Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d at 536. See also German,
supra note 108, at 297 n.61.
11 See D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 569 S.W.2d at 672 (a jury
instruction calling for the jury to apportion between a settling and nonsettling tortfeasor
approved).
112 See Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 61 ("The trial court may then compute the
amount of the judgment to be entered against the nonsettling tortfeasor, thus flxing his
ultimate liability (and incidentally obviating any question of or necessity for contribution") (emphasis added)). See also D.D. Williamson & Co. v Allied Chem. Corp., 569
S.W.2d at 674; Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d at 536-37.
11 See D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 569 S.W.2d at 672. Here
one of the defendants settled for $16,500, while the other defendant went to trial. The
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Thus, settlement by a party for more money than what the
ultimate liability would have been had he or she not settled in
no way dimimshes the liability of the nonsettling parties for their
full proportionate shares of damage to the plaintiff." 4 In addition, since apportionment under KRS section 454.040 eliminates
the right of contribution among multiple tortfeasors," s the
nonsettling defendant cannot recover through contribution from
a party who had settled for less than his proportionate share of
the damages awarded."6 The rationale underlying these rules is
twofold: first, as among joint tortfeasors, liability should be apportioned according to relative fault and not depend upon the
amount of any settlement; second, if a nonsettling tortfeasor can
enforce a right of contribution against a settling torifeasor, the
party who settled will have gained little by settling. Therefore,
any incentive to settle is greatly diminished, in direct opposition
to the public policy encouraging settlements." 7 A different situation arises where the jury is not allowed to apportion damages
or chooses not to apportion damages."8 There is joint liability for
the entire amount of damages when apportionment under KRS
section 454.040 does not apply.1 9 In such circumstances, KS

jury found that the plaintiff's total damages were $20,000 and that each tortfeasor was
50% liable. The Court held that under Orr the nonsettling defendant was liable to the
plaintiff for $10,000. Id. at 674.
114 See td.
115 See note 112 supra.
116 See 569 S.W.2d at 674 ("Orrplainly requires the elimination of any question of
contribution where apportionment is made.").
117 See Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 61. See also 569 S.W.2d at 674.
118 Where there are two joint tortfeasors, and the plaintiff does not intend to assert
a claim against one of them, apportionment is not permitted even if the joined defendant
brings in the other tortfeasor in a third party claim. Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762, 763
(Ky. 1975). In Nix the Court distingushed Orr where there was an active assertion of
a claim and subsequent settlement, thus allowing KRS § 454.040 to apply, and the situation where the plaintiff had not, nor probably ever would have, asserted a claim against
one of two joint tortfeasors. The Court held in this situation the jury could not apportion
damages under KRS § 454.040 because there was only one "defendant" relative to the
plaintiff (the second tortfeasor being a third party defendant) and the statute only allowed apportionment between "defendants." 532 S.W.2d at 763. This result is discussed at
length and criticized in German, supra note 108, at 294-99.
119 Under KRS § 454.040, set out in note 107 supra, a jury may assess either joint
or several damages. If the jury chooses not to apportion, or cannot apportion under the
rationale of Nix, as set out in note 118 supra, then the joint liability provision of KRS
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section 412.03012 permits contribution among joint tortfeasors on
2
an equal apportionment basis.1 1
Under current Kentucky law it is clear that if the jury has
chosen to apportion liability among all defendants and any parties that have settled, the individuals who have settled cannot be

held jointly and severally liable for the entire award, and no right
of contribution exists between nonsettling and settling
tortfeasors.' 22 Since juries must assign a negligence proportion to
each tortfeasor under a comparative negligence system, and juries

are far more likely to apportion damages than are judges, adopting comparative negligence would eliminate any possibility of contribution against settling tortfeasors. Such a result should not obtain without conscious consideration of relevant policies.
If comparative negligence were adopted in Kentucky, KRS
section 454.040, as interpreted by the courts, would offer a satisfactory outcome regarding the relative liability of nonsettling and
settling tortfeasors. Juries may be required to apportion damages
in every instance2 among settling and nonsettling torffeasors.1M

§ 454.040 governs. See Germain, supra note 108, at 294-95. The rationale for allowing
joint liability among multiple tortfeasors is discussed m Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville,
Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Ky. 1959).
120 KRS § 412.030 (1972) states: "Contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced where the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral turpitude."
121 Oluo River Pipeline Corp. v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d at 719 ("Under the doctrine
of contribution, the liability of each joint tort-feasor is equal and is not apportioned on
the basis of causation." (citing Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d at 762; Lexington Country Club
v. Stevenson, 389 S.W.2d 137, 143 n.4 (Ky. 1965); Elpers v. Kimbel, 366 S.W.2d 157,
161 (Ky. 1963)). The question of contribution between settling and nonsettling tortfeasors
under KRS § 412.030 will not be discussed here since the statute would likely be rendered
meamngless by enactment of comparative negligence and would probably be abolished.
See notes 169-73 tnfra and accompanying text.
12
2 See Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 61. See also D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 569 S.W.2d at 674.
123 This would, of course, emasculate KBS § 412.030 as a form of pro rata contribution between nonsettling tortfeasors, since the choice of not apportioning will no longer
be available.
124 Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 61, mandates that when a jury apportions, the
nonsettling tortfeasor's shares must be determined "on the basis of his contributionto causation." Id. (emphasis added). Such language would likely be construed to mean that all
tortfeasors' negligence should be considered by the jury in ascertaining a nonsettling tortfeasor's proportion of the total fault. This was the procedure used for apportionment in
D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 569 S.W.2d at 673.
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The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that when the jury apportions damages there is no right to contribution among settling
and nonsettling tortfeasors.1 Further, the plaintiffs damages
are reduced by the amount of the settlor's proportionate share,
not by the amount of any settlement.126 This amounts to the
identical approach drafted into the UCFA. 12 Thus, Kentucky
courts may apportion the negligence of nonsettling and settling
tortfeasors without the settlor being before the court. 128 Tis
solution comes closest to realizing the apportionment principles
of comparative negligence. Although this result would occur
automatically from a requirement that juries apportion fault under
comparative negligence, passage of UCFA section six, 12 or clear
approval of the same result in an opinion adopting comparative
negligence, would eliminate the possible need for litigation to
resolve the issue.
D

The Effect of ComparativeNegligence on Joint and Several
Liability Among Joint Tortfeasors

Under current Kentucky law, if a jury apportions damages,
joint tortfeasors become severally liable only for the amount of
the award attributed to their own negligence."3° Since with comparative negligence the jury would apportion the negligence of
the plaintiff and all tortfeasors, or at least between the plaintiff
and all defendants, 3 ' the adoption of comparative negligence in
125 569 S.W.2d at 674. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
126 569 S.W.2d at 672. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
127 See UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 44. See also notes 90-91 supra for the language of the
section and its interpretation.
128 This would be like the Wisconsin rule in Piernnger v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d at 106.
See notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text. This seems to be the approach favored by
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 61. See note 124 supra.
129 UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 44. See note 90 supra for the text of this provision.
'30 See KRS § 454.040. See also D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 569
S.W.2d at 672; Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d at 530; Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 59,
for interpretation by Kentucky's highest court.
131 See notes 54-74 supra and accompanying text for the approaches taken by
California, Wisconsin, and the UCFA on the issue of whether the negligence of all tortfeasors should be considered in apportiomng the defendants' negligence. As pointed out
in note 124 supra, current Kentucky law appears to call for consideration of the negligence
of both settling and nonsettling tortfeasors.
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Kentucky without modification of KRS section 454.040 would require that the liability of joint torifeasors be several in all multiparty litigation. If comparative negligence is to be enacted, then the
effect of this statute should be considered in light of the issues to
be discussed in this section.
Where joint and several liability between multiple tortfeasors
existed prior to the enactment of comparative negligence, it has
survived, unless specifically abolished by statute. 32 In some
states, joint and several liability was specifically provided for by
the comparative negligence statutes. ' '3 Three states' statutes pro-

vide for joint and several liability only between defendants found
more negligent than the plaintiff.1 Based upon statutory interpretation or common law doctrines, many other jurisdictions have

judicially decided that joint and several liability survives adoption of comparative negligence. 13
132 See generally V ScHwA Tz, supra note 1, § 16.4 at 253-54; H. WOODS, supra
note 1, § 13:4 at 225-27. For statutes that have been held to abrogate joint and several
liability see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1036 (Supp.
1983).
133 See IDAHO CODE§ 6-803(3)-(4) (1979); UTAH CODEANN. § 78-27-40(2)-(3) (1977);
Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-110(h) (1977). As stated m the Wyoming statute: "W.S. 1-1-110 through
W.S. 1-1-113 do not affect the common law liability of the several joint tortfeasors to have
judgments recovered and payment made from them individually by the injured person
for the whole injury." Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-110(h).
134 See NEv REV. STAT. § 41.141(3) (1979); OR. REV STAT. § 18.485 (1981) and
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). This approach
avoids a situation where a slightly negligent, but solvent, tortfeasor is forced to pay the
plaintiff's entire award when all the other defendants are insolvent.
The Oregon statute is well-stated: "Each joint tortfeasor defendant is jointly and
severally liable for the entire amount of the judgment awarded a plaintiff, except that
a defendant whose percentage of fault is less than that allocated to the plaintiff is liable
to the plaintiff only for that percentage of the recoverable damages." OR. REy. STAT. §
18.485 (1981).
135 See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 903-06
(Cal. 1978)(applying the rationale underlying joint and several liability and finding that
it is still valid under comparative negligence); Weeks v. Feltner, 297 N.W.2d 678, 680
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980)(the argument that comparative negligence is incompatible with
joint and several liability "ignores the fact that the comparative negligence doctrine also
seeks to assure fair and adequate compensation for injured plaintiffs"); Saucier v. Walker,
203 So. 2d 299, 302-03 (Miss. 1967) (interpreting Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-177, -179
(1972)); Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 291 N.W.2d
825, 833-35 (Wis. 1980)(reaffirming the rule allowing joint and several liability first announced in Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 252 N.W at 727-28). But see Brown
v. KeiU, 580 P.2d at 874 (no joint and several liability under the comparative negligence
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The California Supreme Court recently developed a lengthy

rationale for the retention of joint and several liability among
multiple tortfeasors in AMA'-- despite the argument that retaining joint and several liability was logically inconsistent'3 7 with
the decision in which California adopted comparative negligence,
Li v. Yellow Cab Co.138 In Li, the California court stated that

the underlying rationale in adopting comparative negligence was
to replace the illogical and unjust doctrine of contributory
negligence "by a system under which liability for damage will be
borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion
to their respective fault."13 In AMA it was argued that this
reasoning undermined the basis for allowing joint and several
liability, and required its abolition.140 The court stated:
Even though persons are not acting in concert, if the results
produced by their acts are indivisible, each person is held liable
for the whole.
The reasonfor imposing liability on each
for the entire consequences is that there exists no basis for
dividing damages and the law is loath to permit an innocent
plaintiff to suffer as against a wrongdoing defendant.'4'
The defendants had first argued that under comparative negligence
there was now a basis for dividing the damages between
tortfeasors.14 The court countered this argument by stating that
simply because there was a means of apportioning fault, the indivisibility of the injury for joint and several liability was not
abrogated.'4 This analysis is arguably contrary to Li, which at
statute, KAN.STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976)); Howard v. Spafford, 321 A.2d 74, 76 (Vt.
1974)("[VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 § 1036 (Supp. 1983)], as written, does away with joint and
several liability among joint tortfeasors held liable in a judgment.").
136578 P.2d at 899.
137 Id. at 905.
138 532 P.2d at 1226.
139 Id. at 1232.
140 578 P.2d at 905.
141 Id. (quoting Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 218 P.2d 17, 32 (Cal. 1950)(emphass
in original)).
142 578 P.2d at 905.
143 "In other words, the mere fact that it may be possible to assign some percentage
figure to the relative culpability of one negligent defendant as compared to another does
not in any way suggest that each defendant's negligence is not a proximate cause of the
entire indivisible injury." Id.
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least implicitly rejected indivisibility of the injury as a justification for not apportioning loss between plaintiff and defendants; 144 therefore indivisibility should not serve to place the
burden of an insolvent defendant solely on the other
defendants.145
The second argument offered by the defendant was that with
comparative negligence a plaintiff could be awarded damages even
though at fault to some degree.146 If negligent in some manner,
the plaintiff is no longer an "innocent" compared to a wrongdoing defendant, and therefore should also suffer a loss if a defendant proves insolvent. 147 The AMA court responded with two
propositions. First, m many cases the plaintiff would be completely
innocent and to abolish joint and several liability in these circumstances would unfairly place the burden of insolvent defendants upon such innocent plaintiffs.'" Additionally, the court
stated that plaintiffs negligence is only a failure to exercise due
care for his or her own protection and, as such, is not as serious
an offense as the defendant's failure to exercise due care in regard
to others. 149 The first proposition only justifies retention of joint

and several liability where there actually is an innocent
plaintiffi 5 and does not take into account the possibility of having separate rules for negligent and nonnegligent plaintiffs.' 5'
The second proposition suggests that "plaintiff's and defendants'
culpability are of a different order, ' 152 and is arguably inconsistent with the principles underlying Li, since it could be viewed
as questioning the correctness of comparing plaintiffs and defen144See Miller, supra note 19, at 851-52. Cf. 532 P.2d at 1230-32.
145 See Miller, supra note 19, at 851-52.
1'6 578 P.2d at 905.
147 Id.

148
Id.
149Id. at 906.
150 Miller, supra note 19, at 852 (citing 578 P.2d 920-21 (Clark, J., dissenting)).
151See id. (citing 578 P.2d at 920-26 (Clark, J.,dissenting)). This is currently the
situation in Oklahoma. In Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla. 1978), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that under comparative negligence, liability of multiple tortfeasors is several and m proportion to the damages attributable to him or her. But

in Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613, 616-17 (Okla. 1980), the court
held that Laubach did not apply "to that class of negligence litigation in which the plaintiff is not one among several negligent co-actors." Id. at 616.
152 Fleming, supra note 78, at 1483.
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dants' negligence. 53 Moreover, a plaintiff, in breaching a duty of
care to himself, could be creating a large risk of harm to others,
5
as great or greater than any risk created by the defendants.,'
Finally, the court in AMA argued that "abandonment of the
joint and several liability rule would work a serious and unwarranted deleterious effect on the practical ability of negligently injured persons to receive adequate compensation for their
injuries."'-, While this rationale has been given a more polite
reception than the court's other arguments on the grounds that
it upholds the principle of fair compensation for the plaintiffs
injuries,58 it nevertheless has been criticized because of the unfairness joint and several liability could cause defendants. 57 For
example, suppose P is found 40 % negligent, D1, 30 %, D2 , 20%
and D3, 10%. If D3 is the only solvent defendant, he or she could
end up compensating plaintiff for 60 % of the total damages even
though only 10 % at fault. Thus the plaintiff is fully compensated
for injuries but D, has paid far more than his or her proportionate share.' Even if the right of contribution exists, it is of no
avail against insolvent tortfeasors. While this result might be
justifiable in a situation involving a completely innocent plaintiff, it is hardly compatible with the principles of fair apportionment of damages according to fault'5 9where the plaintiff is more
negligent than each of the individual defendants.
The UCFA offers a reasonable compromise to the problems
engendered by joint and several liability. In order to preserve the
just compensation principles of tort law, the UCFA retains joint
and several liability against each party. 60 To assure that one
153

See td. See also Miller, supra note 19, at 853.

154Miller, supra note 19, at 852.

1-5 578 P.2d at 906.
1,56 See Miller, supra note 19, at 853. Professor Miller argues that the Califorma
Supreme Court's opinion failed to disclose the real reason for its refusal to abandon joint
and several liability. Miller's view is that the court thought it was faced with either burdening the plaintiff or the defendants with unsatisfied judgments and "the court chose the
defendant, who at least, is always culpable to bear the burden," as opposed to the plaintiff, who in some instances is faultless. Id. at 854.
157 See id. at 853.

158 Fleming, supra note 78, at 1483-84.

1,1 See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1232. See also Fleming, supra note 78,
at 1483-84; Miller, supra note 19, at 854.
160UCFA § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 39. See note 175 infra for the text of this provision.
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defendant is not ultimately requred to pay more than his or her
apportioned share, contribution is enforceable among defendants
up to their respective proportionate shares.161 Finally, in order to
mitigate the harshness to a solvent defendant when one or more
of the other defendants are insolvent, the UCFA allows the court,
upon motion, to reallocate the uncollectible portion of a judgment
among all other parties, including the plaintiff, according to the
relative degree of fault. 162 This approach balances the need for
just compensation of the plaintiff with fair apportionment of
liability in relation to fault. l 6 A further refinement of the UCFA has been suggested which would retain the reallocation provision, but would make the liability of defendants several, in proportion to their own fault, when the plaintiff is negligent as
well.1 Under this approach the burden is placed on the plaintiff to collect from all negligent defendants, rather than forcing
defendants who have paid more than their share to seek contribution from the other defendants.'B Tins modification has been
justified on two grounds: (1) there are no valid policy reasons for
shifting the burden of obtaining satisfaction of a judgment from
the plaintiff to a defendant; and (2) under a system of reallocation of uncollectible damages with joint and several liability, a
solvent defendant runs the risk that the plaintiff will be insolvent
upon reallocation and unable to repay what he or she has already
collected from the solvent, jointly liable defendant. 6 This suggested refinement is meant to apply only if the plaintiff was guilty of some degree of negligence. 167 When the plaintiff is totally
innocent, joint and several liability must be retained to avoid putting the plaintiff in a worse condition than under contributory
negligence where joint and several liability of defendants is
allowed.'6
161 UCFA §§ 2(c), 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 39, 42. For the text of § 2(c) see note 175 infra.
See note 199 infra for the text of § 4(a).
162 UCFA § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 39. For the text of UCFA § 2(d) see note 175 infra.
16

Tins solution has been endorsed by some commentators. See Fleming, supra note

78, at 1483-84; Miller supra note 19, at 853-54; Note, supra note 19, at 1691.
164 See Pearson, supra note 50, at 361-68.
16 5 Id. at 364.
'6 Id. at 364-65.
167 Id. at 365.
168 Id. at 366.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72

If comparative negligence is adopted in Kentucky without

abrogating the current rules of joint and several liability, the defendants' liability will apparently be several in all cases.'0 This
result would be in keeping with the language used by the Kentucky Supreme Court in interpreting KRS section 454.040.170 If
the legislature intends to retain several liability where the jury

apportions damages, adoption of a statute based upon the one
presently in effect in Kansas17' is advised to clear up any lingering ambiguity resulting from Kentucky case law.172 If, on the
other hand, joint liability is desired, KRS section 454.040 must

be amended or repealed, and the legislature should determine how
joint and several liability will apply in order to avoid unnecessary

169 See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
170 See Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d at 61, (the court stated that where a jury ap-

portions damages in a situation involving joint and several liability between settling and
nonsettling tortfeasors, KRS § 454.040 limits a tortfeasor's ultimate liability to his or her
allocated share). Subsequent cases have made it clear that the several liability of joint tortfeasors announced in Orr also applies where there are no settling defendants. See S.W
Corum Hauling, Inc. v. Tilford, 511 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Ky. 1974); Bacigalupi v. Mucker,
486 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Ky. 1972).
171 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976) which states:
Where the comparative negligence of the parties in any action is an
issue and recovery is allowed against more than one party, each party shall
be liable for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages
to any claimant in the proportion that the amount of his or her causal
negligence bears to the amount of the causal negligence attributed to all parties against whom such recovery is allowed.
17 2
In establishing jury apportionment of negligence between tortfeasors, the enactment of comparative negligence in Kentucky should address directly any lingering problems engendered by the rule that a jury cannot apportion damages when there are only
two tortfeasors and the plaintiff has not, and probably would not, assert a claim against
one of them. See Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d at 762. See also note 118 supra. To retain
this rule under comparative negligence weakens the concept of fair apportionment of
damages in all tortious conduct by replacing it with a haphazard system dependent upon
coincidental interrelationships between the tortfeasors and the injured party. For example, if one of two tortfeasors in an automobile collision were the spouse of the plaintiff,
the jury could not apportion damages even if the negligent spouse were joined by the defendant as a third party defendant. Cf. 532 S.W.2d at 763 (jury cannot apportion where
plaintiff would not assert a claim).
To alleviate all doubt, KES § 454.040 should be repealed or amended to require jurors
to apportion damages among all tortfeasors in every case. The apportionment provision
of the UCFA § 2, 12 U.L.A. 38-39 provides an excellent model for alleviating the current
ambiguity in Kentucky law in the context of comparative negligence.
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subsequent litigation. 173 Three options are available: (1) pure
joint and several liability;'74 (2) a modified form of joint and
several liability with reallocation of uncollectible damages; 175 or
(3) modified several liability with a reallocation provision. 7 6
E.

ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors

The final issue to be addressed regarding multiple party litigation under comparative negligence is the question of what type
of contribution should be allowed among joint tortfeasors found
liable for injury to the plaintiff. 177 Exploration of available approaches must begin within the framework of current Kentucky
law.
The rules of contribution among joint tortfeasors in Kentucky
are the same as those for contribution among nonsettling and set173 Of course, if joint and several liability is adopted, current Kentucky case law
could no longer be relied upon to resolve satisfactorily the issue of contribution against
settling tortfeasors. See text accompanying notes 107-16 supra.A provision permitting or,
as in UCFA, precluding contribution against settling tortfeasors would then be not only
desirable, but necessary. See UCFA § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 39. See the text of UCFA § 2(c)
at note 175 tnfra.
174 Suitable language for such enactment is found in Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-110(h) (1983).
See note 133 supra for the text of this provision.
'75 An excellent model for this approach is the UCFA § 2(c)-(d), 12 U.L.A. 39:
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant
in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction [resulting from
releases], and enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of the
rules of joint-and-several liability.
(d) Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is
entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable
share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate
any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at
fault, according to their respective percentages of fault.
176 See Pearson, supra note 50, at 361-68. This variation is discussed in notes 164-68
supra and accompanying text. No statutes have been drafted to this effect, but a simple
modification of UCFA § 2(c) to mandate several liability would serve this function. Possienter judgment against
ble modification could be made as follows: "The court shall
each party liable on the basis of the rules of [several liability]." See note 175 supra for
the complete text of UCFA § 2(c). In addition, the language in the statute regarding contribution would have to be deleted or rewritten. See UCFA § 2(c)-(d), 12 U.L.A. 39.
177 For a detailed discussion of the history and concepts underlying the doctrine of
contribution, see generally Comment, Contributionand the Distributionof Loss Among
Tortfeasors, 25 AM. U.L. Re. 203 (1975-76). For a discussion of the development of contribution in Kentucky, see generally Germain, supra note 108, at 290-91.
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fling tortfeasors discussed previously.178 Therefore, if Kentucky
law as it presently exists is incorporated wholesale into a system
of comparative negligence there might not be room for contribution among multiple tortfeasors since juries would apportion
damages in every case involving negligence17 This result would
render KRS section 412.030 meaningless18 ° and would remove
the option not to apportion presented in KRS section 454.040.181
This strongly suggests that both statutes ought to be repealed or,
in the case of section 454.040, at least modified with the advent
of comparative negligence.182
Of course, in enacting comparative negligence statutorily, the
Kentucky legislature could decide to change the rules of contribution which have evolved under present law. Such a change should
be closely related to the decision regarding the status of joint and
several liability between multiple tortfeasors, a topic discussed in
detail in the previous section."" For example, if it were decided
that the public policy favoring just compensation to injured plain-

tiffs overrides any unfairness to a defendant liable for an entire

178 See note 112 supra and accompanying text. Orr is not limited to situations involving settling tortfeasors. See S.W Coruin Hauling, Inc. v. Tilford, 511 S.W.2d at 220;
Bacigalupi v. Mucker, 486 S.W.2d at 52.
179Any argument that Orr allowed contribution to survive apportionment by juries
was permanently laid to rest in Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d at 536-37, where the Court
stated: "From a literal construction of KRS § 454.040 there can be little doubt that when
the jury chooses to apportion its award between or among joint tortfeasors their respective liabilities become fixed and finally settled, not only as to the plaintiff or plaintiffs
but as among themselves.
" Id. (emphasis added). See also Ohio River Pipeline Corp.
v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d at 719 ("If the trier of fact chooses to apportion its award among
the joint tort-feasors, the question of contribution becomes moot.").
180 See note 120 supra for the text of KRS § 412.030. As discussed in note 179 supra
where a jury apportions damages there can be no contribution under current Kentucky law.
181 See note 107 supra for the text of KRS § 454.040. At the least, the permissive
language of the statute would have to be deleted to enforce a system of comparative
negligence in all tort litigation.
182 For example, repeal of KRS § 454.040 without simultaneous repeal of KRS §
412.030 creates a situation in which the courts would be forced to hold that under comparative negligence there is pro rata contribution among joint tortfeasors. This certainly
is incompatible with a system of apportionment of liability according to relative fault since
ultimate liability would depend upon the number of other tortfeasors and not their relative
degrees of fault.
183 See text accompanying notes 174-76 supra for a discussion of the options available
regarding joint and several liability.
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judgment, 1s4 or if a system of comparative negligence were
adopted that spread the burden of an unsatisfied judgment among
both plaintiffs and defendants, 185 enactment of joint and several
liability when the jury apportions is an option open to the
legislators. ImBut enactment of joint and several liability must be
accompanied by the establishment of a right of contribution, up
to a defendant's proportionate share, to preserve the fair apportionment principles underlying comparative negligence.187
Proportionate contribution based on relative fault was actually
first introduced outside of the context of comparative negligence
by the 1939 UCATA in the form of an optional provision: "When
there is such a disproportion of fault among joint torifeasors as
to render inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability contribution, the relative degree of fault of the joint
tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata
shares." s Although this provision has been criticized for the ambiguity inherent in the terms "disproportionate" and
"inequitable,"' 89 two states have inserted it verbatim into their

184 This is ultimately the position taken by the California Supreme Court in
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d at 906. See text accompanying
notes 155-56 supra.
185 This is the result achieved under UCFA § 2(d). See text accompanying note 162
supra. For text of UCFA § 2(d) see note 175 supra.
186 See text accompanying notes 174-76 supra for a list of possible options.
187 See, e.g., V SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 16.7, at 260. Professor Schwartz states:
Under the older common-law rule, a tortfeasor who pays a judgment for

which he and other tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable has no enforceable right to contribution from the others. If comparative negligence
is to fulfill its role of apportioning damages on the basis of fault, this rule
must be abolished. If the legislature fails to modify the common-law rule,
the change should be made by the courts.
See also H. WOODS, supra note 1, § 13:5, at 228. ("It is illogical to allocate negligence
of plaintiffs and the defendants and then reject allocation of negligence between defendants."). According to Professor Schwartz, four states, Colorado, Connecticut, Nebraska
and Oklahoma make joint torfeasors jointly and severally liable with no right of contribution. See V SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 16.7, at 268.
188 See 1939 UCATA § 2(4), 12 U.L.A. 37 (1975).
189 See V SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 16.7, at 262.
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comparative negligence statutes, 190 and three states have the op-

tional provision in their statutes relating to contribution.'1,
The 1955 revision of the UCATA dropped the optional provision and inserted language unequivocally disallowing consideration of relative fault in determining the pro rata shares of tort-

feasors for contribution purposes.0 2 Of the states with comparative negligence that have adopted the 1955 UCATA, three
have retained the language forbidding consideration of relative
degrees of fault in determining the pro rata shares;'9 three have
altered their statutes to allow consideration of relative fault in
determination of the pro rata shares; 194 and two leave the meaning of the pro rata shares ambiguous95 Although Kentucky has
adopted neither the 1939 nor the 1955 UCATA, it does have a
statute governing contribution. KRS section 412.030 has been interpreted to call for pro rata contribution among joint torifeasors
190See IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(2) (1977). Both
statutes also state that the determinations of pro rata shares of fault are used "solely for
the purpose of determining their rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law." V
ScHnVARTZ, supra note 1, § 16.7 at 262.
191Three states have adopted the 1939 UCATA with the optional provision. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1002(4) (1962); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 663-12 (1976); S.D. CoNip. LAws
ANN. § 15-8-15 (1969).
Florida limits the right to contribution to the "pro rata" share, as under the 1955
UCATA § 2, 12 U.L.A. 87 (1975), discussed in notes 192-95 infra and accompanying text.
However, the contribution statute expressly states that the "relative degree of fault shall
be the basis for allocation of liability" in defining pro rata share. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.31 (West Supp. 1983).
192 1955 UCATA § 2, 12 U.L.A. 87 (1975) states, in part: "In determining the pro
rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability (a) their relative degrees of fault shall not
"
be considered.
'9 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.020 (1973); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 231B § 2 (Miclue/Law
Co-op. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-02 (1976)(the North Dakota comparative
negligence statute remedies this inconsistency: "When there are two or more persons who
are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of
negligence attributable to each.
" N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975)).
194 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-50.5-103 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. 768.31 (West

Supp. 1983); OHIo REv CODE ANN. § 2307.31(A) (Page 1981).

19 See NEV. REV STAT. § 17.175(2) (1979)(substitutes "equitable share" for "pro rata
share"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANm. tit. 42 § 8324(b) (Purdon 1982). The Pennsylvania contribution statute simply calls for pro rata shares for contribution purposes, but issilent
on whether proportionate fault can be considered in making this determination. However,
the comparative negligence statute alleviates any confusion by providing for contribution
based upon proportionate fault. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2102 (Purdon 1982).
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in situations where it applies' 96 and its existence should be considered in a legislative enactment of comparative negligence,

especially if such enactment simultaneously repeals KRS section
454.040.197

The UCFA's section on contribution was drafted with the intention of replacing the 1955 UCATA in those states which adopted
comparative negligence.198 The section allows contribution

among persons jointly and severally liable based upon an individual's "equitable share" of the damages.199 Although use of
the term 'equitable' in describing the measure of the share might
raise some question as to meaning, any doubt should be dispelled
by the commissioners' comments, which clearly indicate that contribution is based upon proportionate fault."
Many states have had to come to terms with the contemporaneous existence of rules mandating pro rata contribution and
comparative negligence laws. The most influential decision in this
area was that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bielski v.
Schulze.20 ' In Wisconsin, the right of contribution prior to Bielski
196 See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
197 If KRS § 454.040 were repealed by enactment of comparative negligence and
if KRS § 412.030 were left unchanged, the case law interpreting KBS § 454.040 to preclude
contribution where the jury apportions damages (see notes 107-17 supraand accompanying text) would no longer have precedential weight and courts would have to grapple with
contribution in light of KItS § 412.030 alone.
198
See UCFA § 4 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1983).
199 UCFA § 4 provides:
(a) A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for
the same injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered
against all or any of them. It may be enforced either in the original action
or by a separate action brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution
is each person's equitable share of the obligation, including the equitable
share of a claimant at fault, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.
(b) Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settlement
with a claimant only (1) if the liability of the person against whom contribution is sought has been extinguished and (2) to the extent that the amount
paid in settlement was reasonable.
" See UCFA § 4 commissioners' comments, 12 U.L.A. 42-43 ("[T]he test for determinng the measure of contribution and thus establishing the ultimate responsibility is
no longer on a pro rata basis. Instead, it is on a basis of proportionate fault determined
in accordance with the provisions of [UCFA] Section 2.").
201 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962).
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derived from common law and was based upon the pro rata share
of the joint tortfeasor.0 2 The court in Bielski held that the
Wisconsin legislature, in enacting comparative negligence, intended to make recovery contingent on the relative degree of negligence
and, therefore, the only logical approach to the question of contribution was to base shares of common liability on the proportion of causal negligence.m A similar result has been reached in
a number of jurisdictions following the reasoning of the court in
Bielski.)4 An alternative method of reasoning was utilized by the
highest courts of New York and California in overcoming statutes
specifically mandating contribution based on the defendants' pro
rata shares of damagesm to allow, in effect, contribution based
on proportionate fault.2 The courts of both states embraced the
concept of "partial indemnity" and through the use of this semantic
legerdemain avoided the constraints of statutes governing contribution.207 Current Kentucky case law clearly would not tol202 See

td. at 108.

203 Id. at 109.
24 See, e.g., Kennedy & Cohen, Inc. v. Van Eyck, 347 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977)(in the face of a statute modeled after the 1955 UCATA which expressly
precluded consideration of fault in determining pro rata shares, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.31(3)
(1975), the court held it was not error for a court to order contribution on a 20-80% basis
on the ground that it was "basing the order upon the equities between appellees and appellant." (referring to FU. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(3)(b)). The statute was subsequently
amended to call for consideration of relative fault in determinnng pro rata shares. See note
191 supra; Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169, 179-80 (Me. 1971)(the right to contribution derived from common law and the court decided to follow the exact rationale of Bielshd;
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977)(overruling a long line
of cases to the contrary, the court adopted contribution based on relative fault); Rogers
v. Spady, 371 A.2d 285, 287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)(interpreting a provision
in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West Supp. 1983-84) calling for contribution up to the
percentage share to mean the percentage share of negligence attributable to that tortfeasor).
2 See CAL. CIv PRo. CODE § 876 (West 1980)(section (a) provides: "The pro rata
share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be determined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them."); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1401 (McKinney 1976)(the
current version was amended in 1974 to conform to Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d
288 (N.Y. 1972)). Compare the N.Y. Civ PRAc. LAw § 1401 with Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 282 N.E.2d at 291-92.
206 See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d at 899; Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d at 288.
201 See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d at 907-16 (relying
on language in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 calling for liability based on proportionate fault). There was a possible conflict with CAL. Civ PRO. CODE § 876(a) (West
1980) (see note 205 supra for the text of this statute), which only allowed contribution based
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erate any notion that indemnity could be "partial'" and, therefore, even if sound reasons could be expressed for adoption of such
a doctrine, it would be unlikely to meet with a friendly reception
in the courts of Kentucky.m
The problems that have arisen in California, New York and
Wisconsin, brought on by the coexistence of laws calling for contribution based on pro rata shares and comparative negligence
statutes, point sharply to the need for legislative clarity in enacting comparative negligence. Existing laws which are contradictory to the principles of comparative negligence should be dealt
with from the beginning. Contribution based on pro rata shares
is a prime example of a law which is incompatible with the fair
apportionment principles of comparative negligence. Where liability is to be based upon relative fault and multiple torifeasors are
held jointly and severally liable, it is imperative that contribution be based on proportionate fault..2 10 The UCFA offers suitable
language for drafting this approach into a comparative negligence
statute.21' Of course, the need for such enactment would be obviated by the retention of several liability among joint tortfeasors
22
when damages are apportioned.
on an equal division. The court modified the existing common law concerning indemnification to allow "partial" indemnification based upon proportionate fault by holding
that the legislative history did not show an attempt to prevent the judiciary from furthering the act's purpose of easing the unfairness of the no contribution rule. 578 P.2d at 912-14.
New York likewise adopted a similar rationale in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d
at 288. N.Y. Cry. PnAc. LAw § 1401 called for pro rata distribution of shares for contribution purposes, but the court allowed apportionment of liability based on indemnity,
thereby circumventing the express statutory language. 282 N.E.2d at 291, 293. The statute
was subsequently amended in 1974 to remove the requirement of pro rata shares. See note
205 supra.
" See Oho River Pipeline Corp. v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979) ("Indemnity, in essence, is shifting the entire loss from one torifeasor who has been
compelled to pay it to the shoulders of another who should bear it instead." (emphasis
added)(quoting V V Cooke Chevrolet, Inc. v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 451 S.W.2d 428,
430 (Ky. 1970)). See also Germain, supra note 108, at 290-91.
" See note 197 supra, for an example of how the need for such a doctrine could
arise in Kentucky.
210 Commentators have uniformly approved proportionate contribution. See Pearson, supra note 50, at 369 n.100.
211 See UCFA § 4, 12 U.L.A. 42. See note 199 supra for the text of this provision.
To remove any ambiguity and the inevitable resulting litigation, the word "proportionate"
should be substituted for the word "equitable." See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
212 See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text. If defendants are only severally
liable for their apportioned share, there is no need to enforce contribution among them.
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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND LAST CLEAR CHANCE

The doctrine of last clear chance evolved as a palliative for
213
the harshness of the contributory negligence bar to recovery.
A contributorily negligent plaintiff can recover if he or she can
prove that the defendant could have avoided injury to the plaintiff by the exercise of proper care after the negligent act of the

plaintiff.214 Two rationales are often cited to support the last
clear chance doctrine: (1) if the defendant had a clear opportunity to avoid injury to the plaintiff and failed to act reasonably in
doing so, then the plaintiff's negligence is not the proximate cause
of his or her injury;215 and (2) the defendant's negligence involves
a higher degree of fault than the plaintiff's, and thus last clear
chance is actually a method allowing for comparing relative

fault.2 16 As Dean Prosser has written, neither reason actually explains the existence of the doctrine.2i7 Its true origin stems from

courts' dislike of the harshness of the doctrine of contributory
negligence.2 1 8 To the extent that adoption of comparative negli213 See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1050 (Alaska 1975)("But it is recognized by

nearly all who have reflected upon the subject that the last clear chance doctrine is, in
the final analysis, merely a means of ameliorating the harshness of the contributory
negligence rule." (footnote omitted)).
214 See generally W PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 427-33 (4th ed.
1971); V SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 129-40.
215 W PROSSER, supra note 214, at 427; V ScnVARTz, supra note 1, at 130.
216 W PROSSER, supra note 214, at 428. The idea that a defendant's culpability is
somehow greater than a negligent plaintiffs was one of the rationales used by the California
Supreme Court in AMA to justify retamng joint and several liability among tortfeasors.
See text accompanying note 149 supra. This reasoning has been sharply criticized. See
notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
217 Saying that defendant's last clear chance keeps the plaintiff's negligence from being the proximate cause of his own injury leads to anomalous results. For instance, driver
A who negligently put himself in a helpless position of peril, and whose car is hit by a
negligent driver, B, who is aware of the peril, would still be liable to a third party, C,
injured by the collision. See, e.g., cases cited in W PROSSER, supra note 214, at 427 n.8;
V ScHwA'Tz, supra note 1, at 130 n.8. It is illogical to say that the collision was proximately caused by A for purposes of compensating C's injury, but that the same collision
was not proximately caused by A for purposes of As injury. W PROSSER, supra note 214,
at 427-28.
The argument that the defendant is more culpabale merely because his negligence
occurred later in time is illogical. Obviously, very gross negligence can put a plaintiff in
a position of helpless peril.
218 See W PRoSSER, supra note 214, at 428; V ScinVA Tz, supra note 1, §§ 7.1-.2,
at 130-31, 139 n.57.
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gence mitigates that very harshness, the doctrine of last clear
chance is no longer needed and should be discarded.
A.

Last Clear Chance sn Kentucky

Since only two states have had the legislative foresight to deal
with the last clear chance doctrine upon the enactment of comparative negligence statutes,219 its common law existence in states
adopting comparative negligence has spawned much litigation.2m
In Kentucky, last clear chance was initially rejected in a long line
of cases 21 before finally being recognized in 1911.22 It has evolved into a concept allowing recovery for negligent plaintiffs in two
types of situations: (1) the plaintiffs' negligence places them in a
position of peril from which they are unable to extricate themselves
and the defendants either knew or, using reasonable care, should
have discovered this peril m time to avoid the injury; and (2) plaintiffs could have escaped the peril but were inattentive and were
injured by defendants who were aware of the danger and negligently failed to avoid the injury.22 Although all three of the rationales expressed for the existence of last clear chance have been
expounded by Kentucky courts,2 the Kentucky Supreme Court
219 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(c) (West Supp. 1983-84) ("The legal doetines of last clear chance and assumption of risk in actions to which this section is applicable are abolished."); OR. REV STAT. § 18.475(1) (1981)("The doctrine of last clear
chance is abolished.").
22 E.g., Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968); Ratlief v. Yokum, 280
S.E.2d 584, 588-89 (W Va. 1981). See generally the cases cited in H. WooDs, supranote
1, § 8:3.
221 See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Trisler, 131 S.W 198, 200 (Ky. 1910) for a list
of cases rejecting last clear chance.
22 See Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Banks' Adm'r, 137 S.W 1066, 1074 (Ky. 1911)
(Although the decision is equivocal in adopting the doctrine, subsequent cases that clearly accept last clear chance cite this case as authority. E.g., Louisville Ry. v. Broaddus'
Adm'r, 202 S.W 654, 658 (Ky. 1918).
223 See Beasley v. Standard Paving & Eng'g Co., 511 S.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Ky. 1974);
General Tel. Co. v. Yount, 482 S.W.2d 567, 568-69 (Ky. 1972). See also Ausness, Kentucky Law Survey-Torts, 63 Ky. L.J. 753, 758-60 (1974-75).
2 See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Yount, 482 S.W.2d at 568 ("The doctrine of last
clear chance is a humanitarian doctrine designed to soften the harsh effects of the con"); Johnson v. Morms' Adm'x, 282 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Ky.
tributory negligence rule.
1955)("In a sense, [last clear chance] compares the negligence of the parties."); Under-
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in recent years has recognized that the last clear chance doctrine
is a means to soften the harshness to plaintiffs of the complete
defense of contributory negligence.2 Therefore, whether to continue to recognize last clear chance after adoption of comparative
negligence should depend primarily on whether the harshness of
contributory negligence still needs to be mitigated under the new
system. The answer to this question depends, in part, upon whether
a pure or modified system of comparative negligence is adopted.
B.

Pure Comparative Negligence and Last Clear Chance

Under pure comparative negligence, plaintiffs are allowed to
recover for their injuries regardless of whether they are more
negligent than the defendants. Therefore, contributory negligence
is never a complete bar to recovery but, instead, serves only to
reduce plaintiffs' awards by the percentages of negligence attributed to them.m If the last clear chance doctrine were retained under pure comparative negligence, plaintiffs would be allowed
their entire damages without reduction for their own negligence
when it is determined that the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the occurrence.22 7 Because such an application of the
doctrine of last clear chance would severely limit the impact of
a pure comparative negligence rule,2 the courts of four states,
in adopting pure comparative negligence, expressly eliminated the
doctrine of last clear chance.2 An additional reason cited by
wood v. Gardner, 249 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Ky. 1952)("Where both parties are negligent,
the one with the last dear opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence
of the other, is held wholly responsible for it, his negligence being deemed the direct and
proximate cause of it." (citations omitted)).
2 See General Tel. Co. v. Yount, 482 S.W.2d at 568.
226 E.g., V ScuvARTz, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 46.
227 Id. § 7.2, at 133.
See td. § 7.2, at 137; Prosser, supra note 10, at 27.
9 See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1050 (Alaska 1975)("Without the contributory
negligence rule there would be no need for the palliative doctrine of last clear chance.
To give continued life to that principle would defeat the very purpose of the comparative
negligence rule-the apportionment of damages according to the degree of mutual fault.");
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1240 (Cal. 1975)("[W]hen true comparative
negligence is adopted, the need for last clear chance as a palliative of the hardships of
the 'all-or-nothing' rule disappears and its retention results only m a windfall to the plaintiff
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these courts for the abolition of the doctrine was that it arose in
order to mitigate the harshness of contributory negligence as a complete defense to recovery for an injured plaintiff, and therefore
is no longer required under pure comparative negligence.
Since Kentucky courts have recognized that the underlying
justification for last clear chance is solely to relieve the harshness
of contributory negligence,2 1 if pure comparative negligence
were adopted judicially the doctrine of last clear chance should
be abolished simultaneously. Not only would it have no reason
to exist, but it would also serve as a barrier to fair apportionment
of damages according to fault and result in unjustifiable windfalls to otherwise culpable plaintiffs. Any statutory enactment of
pure comparative negligence should not ignore the common law
existence of last clear chance, since to do so would cause unnecessary litigation.2 32 Enactment of pure comparative negligence in Kentucky should include a statutory provision like that
of Oregon23 expressly abolishing last clear chance.
C. Modified Comparative Negligence and Last Clear Chance
Contributory negligence continues to serve as a bar to recovery
by a plaintiff who is fifty percent or more negligent under many
modified comparative negligence systems.2- Therefore, in modified comparative negligence states there is a stronger argument
supporting the retention of last clear chance,25 and the courts of
in direct contravention of the pnnciple of liability in proportion to fault."); Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437-38 (Fla. 1973)("The doctrine of last clear chance would, of
course, no longer have any application in these cases."); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886,
898 (fI. 1981)("We have already noted that the doctrine of 'last clear chance' was created
to escape the harshness of the contributory negligence rule. As the need for it disappears
in the face of this decision, the vestiges of the doctrine of 'last clear chance' are hereby
abolished.").
230 See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d at 1047; Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1240;
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d at 438; Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
231See General Tel. Co. v. Yount, 482 S.W.2d at 568.
232 See generally H. WOODS, supra note 1, §§ 8:2-7 (discussing various inconsistent
approaches to last clear chance in jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence).
233 On. 1Ev. STAT. § 18.475(1)(1981)("The doctrine of last clear chance is
abolished.").
234 See V ScwARTz, supra note 1, at § 3.5.
23 See id. § 6.2 at 139; Durney, Last Clear Chance and ComparativeNegligence,
45 INTER AmA, Dec. 1980, at F9, F11-12.
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a few such states have refused to abolish the doctrineYm Three
rationales for retaining last clear chance have been advanced: (1)
where legislative enactment of comparative negligence did not
abolish last clear chance, the legislative intent was to retain it;237
(2) last clear chance is grounded in proximate cause and is not
altered by comparing degrees of fault;m and (3) the "party who
has a last clear opportunity to avoid [an] accident should bear
greater responsibility for it" even though the plaintiff's negligence
may be greater than that of the defendant.2 39 None of these are
persuasive. The first argument avoids any policy analysis and is
inconsistent with the notion that a legislature, in enacting comparative negligence, intended for liability to be in proportion to
fault, while application of the last clear chance doctrine abrogates
apportonment.240 The second argument relies on the untenable
and repudiated idea that the last clear chance doctrine can be supported on proximate cause grounds.4 1 The third argument does
not logically support retention of last clear chance because any
greater culpability inhenng in having the last opportunity to avoid
injury will result in greater responsibility under modified comparative negligence anyway. Having an opportunity to avoid an
accident and failing to do so should merely be a factor in measur-

236 See, e.g., Malcolm v. Dox, 100 N.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Neb. 1960)(Nebraska has

a slight-gross form of modified comparative negligence. For a discussion of this type of
system see V ScmvAnRz, supra note 1, at § 3.4(B); H. WOODS, supra note 1, at 514-15
app., Hanson v. N.H. Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc., 268 A.2d 841, 844 (N.H. 1970)(In New
Hampshire, plaintiffs can recover so long as their negligence is not greater than defendants' See generally H. WOODS, supra note 1, at 519 app. The court in Hanson simply
refused, with little discussion, to abolish last clear chance); Wilson v. Great N. Ry., 157
N.W.2d 19, 24 (S.D. 1968)("Nevertheless, it has been recognized that under certain factual situations it might be 'within the province of the jury to find that the negligence of
defendant after discovering plaintiffs peril was the proximate cause of her injuries.' "(footnote omitted). South Dakota has a umque form of comparative negligence sometimes referred to as slight-ordinary. For a discussion of this type of system, see generally V
ScinvARTz, supra note 1, § 3.4(B) and H. WOODS, supra note 1, at 555 app.).
237 V SCmHAR, supra note 1, § 7.2, at 136-37.
M Id. § 7.2 at 137. Dean Prosser characterized this explanation of last clear chance
as 'very questionable" PROSSER, supra note 10, at 27.
239 See Durney, supra note 235, at 11-12.
240 See V SCHwARTZ, supra note 1, § 7.2 at 137.
241

See note 217 supra and accompanying text.
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ing the parties' relative negligence and does not logically require
full recovery for a negligent plaintiff.=
The purpose of softemng the harshness of the contributory
negligence bar might support the retention of last clear chance
under modified comparative negligence in some circumstances,
however. If Kentucky were to adopt a system of modified comparative negligence in which a plaintiff fifty percent or more
negligent is barred from recovering, situations would arise where
a plaintiff whose negligence is equal to or greater than that of the
defendant would be denied compensation for injuries suffered.
To the extent that the doctrine of contributory negligence thus
survives, the same harsh results to plaintiffs which were mitigated
by last clear chance would remainY3 It would be untenable to
argue that the last clear chance doctrine should enable a plaintiff
who is fifty percent or more negligent to recover one hundred percent of the total damages under modified comparative negligence,
as this defeats fair apportionment of damages with fault, and might
even reward a plaintiff for being more than fifty percent negligent.
But a variation of modified comparative negligence that essentially switches over to pure comparative negligence when a defendant's last clear chance is established 2" could serve to mitigate
the harshness of contributory negligence in modified systems. Although this approach has been recommended,m it has not been
adopted, possibly because of the complexity involved in its application and the fact that legislative intent in enacting a modified
form of comparative negligence might well have been to preclude
plaintiffs from being compensated for their injuries if they are
242

See HEFr & HEFT, supra note 1, § 1.220:
No real reason exists under the philosophy of comparative negligence

to continue the rule of last clear chance, since the doctrine's component
parts-the degree of plaintiffs negligence, its remoteness m time, the degree
of defendant's negligence, the efficiency of its causation, the defendant's
awareness of plaintiffs peril, the defendant's opportunity to avoid doing
damage and his failure to do so-remain as factors to be considered by the

jury in measuring and comparing the parties' relative fault.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
243 Cf. General Tel. Co. v. Yount, 482 S.W.2d at 568.
'" For example, if the jury finds P 55% negligent and D 45% negligent, but D had
the last clear chance to avoid the accident and negligently failed to do so, then P could

recover 45% of the entire award instead of no recovery being allowed.
M See Durney, supra note 235, at F12.
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found to be more negligent than defendants. Indeed, if the court
or legislature adopting comparative negligence is concerned about
the harshness of the contributory negligence bar to recovery where
the plaintiff is fifty percent or more negligent, the court or
legislature should simply adopt pure comparative negligence.
Since last clear chance is a viable doctrine in Kentucky and
is difficult to reconcile with the existence of modified comparative
negligence, it should be addressed in either a judicial adoption
or a legislative enactment of a modified system. Most state courts
which have been confronted with this issue have abolished last
clear chance 46 and the two states whose statutes address last
clear chance have chosen to abolish it.24 In addition, the great
majority of commentators have concluded that comparative
negligence and last clear chance are incompatible. 248 In light of
this overwhelming trend toward abolition of last clear chance in
comparative negligence states, Kentucky should follow a similar
path and abolish it along with any Judicial adoption of comparative
negligence, or insert a clause to that effect in any statutory enactment.2 49 The complexities involved in applying a last clear
chance doctrine under a modified system without interfering with
fair apportionment far outweigh any benefits arising from designing and maintaining such a system.
III.

SETOFF IN CoMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE

In a tort action involving negligence of both the plaintiff and
defendant, a counterclaim will often be asserted by the defendant
for compensation for his or her injuries. In those comparative
246

See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d at 1050; Iav. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d at 1240;

Bums v. Ottati, 513 P.2d 469, 472 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d
at 438; Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846, 847-51 (Me. 1968); Scott v. Webb, 583 S.W.2d
846, 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Ratlief v. Yocum, 280 S.E.2d at 588-89; Butts v. Ward,
279 N.W 6, 13 (Wis. 1938); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 194-95 (Wyo. 1979).
But see cases cited at note 236 supra.
247 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(c); On. REv. STAT. § 18.475(1).
M See, e.g., V ScmvATz, supra note 1, § 7.2 at 139 & n.61. But see Durney, supra

note 235, at F12.
249 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-527h(c); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.475(1) for examples of possible statutory language. See note 219 supra for the two statutes that have
done so and the statutory language adopted.
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negligence jurisdictions where it is possible that both the plaintiff
and defendant may be entitled to recover damages, it must be
determined whether the damages awarded to each should be set
off by the court to arrive at one award. If so, the real winner in
many comparative negligence cases may be the liability insurance

company whose aggregate liability is lessened.2 Under one common form of modified comparative negligence, claimants are en-

titled to damages only when their negligence is less than that of
the adverse party.-"' Under such a system, the question of setoff
usually does not arise since only the claim or counterclaim can

bring recovery to the less negligent party.252 Setoff does raise
questions in modified comparative negligence jurisdictions where
the fifty percent negligent claimant is allowed recovery and in pure
comparative negligence states. A review of current Kentucky law
regarding setoff will set the stage for resolution of the problems
raised by setoff under comparative negligence.
A.

Kentucky Law of Setoff and Counterclaim

In Kentucky, the procedure for bringing counterclaims is
governed by CR 13.01 and 13.02. The civil rules compel a
counterclaimant to plead any counterclaim arising out of the "same
transaction or occurrence" in the responsive pleading to the original
claim regarding that transaction or occurrenceA25 Counterclaims
against opposing parties are permitted in other than responsive
pleadings when the claim did not arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence that [was] the subject matter of the [original]
claim."- Under these liberal rules, counterclaims are often
250 See generally H. WooDs, supra note 1, at § 17:2 (discussing setoff in pure comparative negligence states).
251 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
2 52
. For example, P sues D and D counterclaims. If the jury finds P 45% negligent
and D 55% negligent, P would recover 55% of the entire damages and D would recover

nothing on the counterclaim. Similarly, if D was 45% negligent and P 55% negligent,
only D would be allowed recovery. If the jury found each party 50% negligent neither

would be entitled to damages.
In certain multiparty situations, however, setoff problems may still arise. See text
accompanying notes 259-60 tnfra.
253 See CR 13.01.

254 See CR 13.02.
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asserted in tort actions.25 But no issue regarding whether one
claimant's award should be setoff against the other's can arise,
because under current law a party's contributory negligence completely bars recovery. Only the claimant alone or the counterclaimant alone can be awarded damages for injuries arising out of
a single tortious occurrence. But if contributory negligence is
removed as an absolute bar to recovery, situations could arise
where both claimants and counterclaimants would be entitled to
damages.
Since this situation cannot occur under present negligence law,
there is no precedent as to whether there should be a reduction
of each claimant's award by the amount of a counterclaimant's
award under tort law. But it has long been the rule in Kentucky
that when damages are awarded in other types of counterclaims,
the defendant's award should be set off against any award to the
plaintiff and judgment should be for the party with the highest
award in one amount.2- Depending on the type of comparative
negligence adopted in Kentucky, such a rule could greatly reduce
total recoveries in tort litigation.
B.

Setoff and Modified Comparative Negligence

In states that maintain contributory negligence as a bar to the
plaintiffs recovery when his or her negligence is greater than or
equal to defendant's,2 setoff due to a successful counterclaim is
not normally an issue because either the plaintiff or defendant will
be entitled to an award of damages, but not both.m A problem
can arise from multiparty litigation in jurisdictions that follow
the Arkansas rule which compares the plaintiffs negligence to that
2 Even under earlier pleading rules, counterclaims sounding in tort were permissible when arising out of the same transaction as the original complaint. See, e.g., Kramer
v. Cough, 220 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ky. 1949)(where defendant counterclmned based on
plaintiffs negligence, "[the cause of action stated in the counterclaim certainly arose out
of the transaction stated in the petition, and was connected with the subject of the action" and therefore was erroneously dismissed as an improper counterclaim.)
M E.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lexington-Hazard Express Co.'s Receiver,
54 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Ky. 1932); Moore v. Caruthers, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 532, 541 (1856).
25 See V ScmWanTz, supra note 1, § 3.5(B) at 76, 22 (1978 Supp.).
M H. WOODS, supra note 1, at § 17:1.
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of the defendants' combined negligence.5 9 Under this rule each
litigant could be less negligent than the combined negligence of
all the opposing parties; thus each could be entitled to an
award. 0
More than one opposing party can also be entitled to damages
under modified comparative negligence in those states like New
Hampshire which allow recovery to aplamtiff equally as negligent
as a defendant. 26 ' In these states a plaintiff and defendant claiming damages against each other could both be found fifty percent
at fault and both be eligible to recover damages from the other.
C.

Setoff and Pure Comparative Negligence

The problem of setoff will arise most frequently under a pure
comparative negligence system. In every case where a counterclaim
is asserted in which both the plaintiff and defendant are found
to be negligent to some degree, the question of whether to set off
recovery can arise. This follows from the fact that under pure comparative negligence a claimant is entitled to recover even when
his or her negligence exceeds that of an opposing party.262 Thus
the courts in those states adopting pure comparative negligence
have had the most opportunity to decide whether or not the awards
received by opposing parties ought to be offset.m
D.

Approaches to Problems of Setoff

The major difficulties in allowing setoff under comparative
negligence are that it can undermine the just compensation ob29 See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
260 For example, if P is 40% negligent, D 1, D2 , and D3 are each 20% negligent and
all the defendants counterclaim against P and crossclaim against each other, the negligence
of each claimant is less than the combined negligence of the adverse parties. H. WOODS,
supra note 1, at § 17:1.
261 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
22 For example, P is 60 % negligent, D is 40 % negligent, and D has counterclaimed. P's damages are assessed at $100,000 and so P is entitled to recover $40,000 from D.
D's damages are assessed at $50,000 and D is entitled to recover $30,000 from P. See H.
WOODS, supra note 1, at § 17:3.
2 E.g., Jess v. Herrmann, 604 P.2d 208, 210-15 (Cal. 1979); Stuyvesant Ins. Co.
v. Bournazian, 342 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1977); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d at 439 (Fla.
1973). See also H. WooDs, supra note 1, § 17:2, at 358 ("In pure jurisdictions the
possibilities of counterclaims and setoffs are unlimited.").
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jectives of tort law while simultaneously producing a windfall for
liability insurance carriers at the expense of insured claimants."
For example, suppose a twenty percent negligent plaintiff is injured to the extent of $5,000 in an accident and an eighty percent
negligent defendant has a successful counterclaim finding damage
in the amount of $50,000. Under pure comparative negligence,
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover $4,000 from the defendant and the defendant should be given an award of $10,000 on
the counterclaim. If these awards are offset the result is a judgment for the defendant for $6,000.m If neither party has his or
her liability covered by insurance this result is fair. It merely serves
to avoid duplicative exchanges of money and reduces the risk that
one of the claimants will be deprived of the value of his or her
award if the other claimant is insolvent.m But if both parties
have sufficient insurance, the reduction in awards through setoff
would serve only to benefit their insurance carriers, while preventing the claimants from receiving their full damages. This causes
an anomalous situation in which the liability of an insurer is not
dependent upon the damages caused by the insured so much as
it depends upon the amount of damages incurred by the
insured. 6
The Florida Supreme Court, in adopting pure comparative
negligence in Hoffman v. Jones,m held that where both parties
are negligent, setoff should result in one judgment in favor of the
party having the larger verdict.2 9 Several years later, however,
0 the Florida
in Stuyvesant Insurance Company v. Bournazian,27
court decided that the rule in Hoffman only applied where no insurance was involved, on the theory that allowing setoff abrogated
the insurer's contractual obligations to the insured.2'
264 E.g., Jess v. Herrmann, 604 P.2d at 212.
M Walkowiak, Innocent Injury and Loss Distribution: The Florda Comparative
Negligence System, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv 66, 82 n.56 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So.2d at 473.
267 See Jess v. Herrmann, 604 P.2d at 212.

M 280 So. 2d at 431.

Id. at 439.
342 So. 2d at 471.
Id. at 473-74. The court's reasoning is interesting. The court held that the Jury's
verdict, before offset, defined the "legal liability" of an insurer under a given policy and
that to reduce the insurer's liability by setoff would be tantamount to forcing the insured
269
270
271
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Express recognition of the windfall resulting to insurance compames through setoff underlies the holding of the Supreme Court
of California in Jess v. Herrmann.-72 The court found there
would be no setoff under pure comparative negligence:
As these facts demonstrate, a mandatory setoff rule in the
typical setting of insured torfeasors does not serve as an innocuous accounting mechanism or as a beneficial safeguard
against an adversary's insolvency but rather operates radically
to alter the parties' ultimate financial position. Such a mandatory rule diminishes both injured parties' actual recovery
and accords both insurance compames a corresponding fortuitous windfall at their insureds' expense. 27 3
Thus, of the two pure comparative negligence jurisdictions that
have confronted the issue of setoff judicially, both have favored
full recovery of the claimants' awards where they are to be paid
by the opposing party's insurer, allowing no setoff.
Some comparative negligence statutes produce very different
results from that reached by the courts of California and Florida.
The Texas statute, for instance, mandates setoff where both the
plaintiff and defendant are allowed to recover. 274 Texas has a
New Hampshire type of modified comparative negligence, so setoff
may occur when a jury finds a plaintiff and a defendant equally
negligent. 27 5 This provision has been severely criticized for causing unfairness to litigants and for the complications it will cause

to pay a portion of the insurer's legal obligation. See id. For a detailed discussion of the
Hoffman and Bournaztan decisions, see Walkowiak, supra note 265.
272 604 P.2d at 208.
273 Id. at 211-12. The court in Jess reserved judgment on whether setoff could ever
be used if no insurance was involved. See id. at 213-14.
274 See TEx. REv. Civ STAT. ANN. art. 2212a § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83)("[T]he
claimant who is liable for the greater amount is entitled to a credit toward his liability
in the amount of damages owed him by the other claimant.").
275 See Tax. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). This
statute also calls for comparing the plaintiff's negligence to the combined negligence of
the "persons or parties against whom recovery is sought." Id. Therefore, setoff would also
be mandated in multiparty situations when plaintiff is less negligent than the negligence
of the defendants combined.
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in evaluating claimsY*6 Two states, Oregon and Rhode Island,
have statutes which, in complete contrast to the Texas statute, absolutely prohibit setoff2 77 These statutes have been criticized for
being overly broad in not allowing setoff even when there are uninsured parties involved, thus preventing an uninsured claimant from
using the amount awarded to reduce his or her liability to the opposing party.78
The drafters of the UCFA have attempted to forge a compromise to eliminate this possibility of unfairness if setoff is never
allowed, while avoiding the conflict with the just compensation
principles of comparative negligence when setoff benefits insurers
at the expense of insured parties. There are two different versions
of UCFA section three. The 1977 version provided for allowing
setoff of all awards but, where either or both claimants were
covered by insurance, the insurers were required to pay their own
insured any amounts the insurer's liability was reduced by virtue
of a setoff.27 9 The rationale expressed for this appraoch was that
setoff, in reducing the award of a claimant and the liability of
his or her insurer to an opposing party, results in the claimant
paying a portion of the insurer's liability. Therefore, requiring the
insurer to repay to the insured any of the benefits the insurer derived because of the insured's reduction in damages is far.2w
276 See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 12 (1974). Dean

Keeton also illustrates the extreme complications that can be caused by setoff in multiple
party litigation. See id. at 12-13.
277 OR. REv STAT. § 18.490 (1981)("Setoff of damages shall not be granted m actions subject to [the statutes governing comparative negligence]."); R.I. GEN. LANs §
9-20-4.1 (Supp. 1982)("There shall be no set-off of damages between the respective
parties.").
278 See UCFA § 3 commissioners' comment (1977) quoted in V ScmvARz, supra
note 1, § 21.4 at 136 (Supp. 1978); V SCmVARTZ, supra note 1, at § 19.3; H. WOODS,
supra note 1, at § 17:4; Pearson, supra note 50, at 359.
279 UCFA § 3, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1983) stated:
A claim and counterclaim shall be set off, and only the difference between
them is recoverable in the judgment. However, if either or both of the claims are covered by liability insurance and an insurance carrier's liability under
its policy is reduced by reason of the set-off, the insured is entitled to recover
from the carrier the amount of the reduction. Amounts so recovered shall
be credited against pertinent liability policy limits. For purposes of uninsuredmotorist and similar coverages, the amounts so recovered shall be treated
as payment of these amounts to the insured by the party liable.
20 See UCFA § 3 commissioners' comment (1977) quoted in V ScvWARTz, supra
note 1, § 21.4, at 136 (Supp. 1978).
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In 1979, UCFA section three was amended to provide a different solution to the problem of setoff. The amended section now
provides that there shall be no setoff except where agreed upon
by both parties.2-8 As a result, insurance companies obtain no
windfall. The unfairness of not allowing setoff where one party
is insolvent and a portion of the judgment is uncollectible is
alleviated by a provision that a claimant may petition the court
to order both parties to pay into the court for subsequent distribution. The court will then distribute the funds collected in a manner allowing the solvent tortfeasor to obtain full credit for payment to the insolvent claimant, yet receive back from the court
the amount he or she is owed by the insolvent claimant out of the
funds the solvent claimant paid in originally This procedure results
in the functional equivalent of setoff, but only where some part
of a judgment is uncollectible.282
The options available to Kentucky concerning the question of
setoff are as varied as the types of comparative negligence. If a
modified form is adopted which only allows recovery to claimants
less negligent than the party the claim was asserted against and
which requires comparison of each claimant's negligence with that
of each party individually in multiparty situations, there would
never be litigation over a single occurrence in which two opposing claimants could receive awards.m This situation is identical
to the current state of tort law setoff in Kentucky,2 so the issue
need not be addressed. But if Kentucky were to adopt either (a)
a pure comparative negligence system, or (b) a modified com281 UCFA § 3, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1983), which states:

A claim and counterclaim shall not be set off against each other, except by agreement of both parties. On motion, however, the court, if it finds

that the obligation of either party is likely to be uncollectible, may order
that both parties make payment into court for distribution. The court shall
distribute the funds received and declare obligations discharged as if the payment into court by either party had been a payment to the other party and

any distribution of those funds back to the party making payment had been
a payment to him by the other party.
282 See note 281 supra for the text of UCFA § 3. For examples of how the statute
works to allow no setoff where both parties are solvent or insured, but results in a func-

tional setoff where one or more of the parties is insolvent or has inadequate insurance,
see UCFA § 3 commissioners" comment, 12 U.L.A. 41-42, illustrations 4-8 (Supp. 1983).
283 H. WooDs, supra note 1, at § 17:1.

284 See notes 253-56 supra and accompanying text.
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parative negligence system which (1) allows a fifty percent
negligent plaintiff to recover or (2) permits comparison of a claimant's negligence to that of all other tortfeasors in multiparty
litigation, more than one claimant will be entitled to recover for
injuries arising out of a single tortious occurrence and the issue
of whether to permit setoff in negligence cases will arise.2 The
issue should be disposed of at the time one of these types of comparative negligence is adopted.
As discussed earlier, reducing damages by the amount of the
awards of successful counterclaimants could lead to unsatisfactory results.2 8 A great amount of authority in other jurisdictions
and many cormentators express the view that allowing setoff
where both parties are fully insured defeats the just compensation of injured parties while benefiting only insurance
companies.28 On the other hand, if setoff is allowed in all cases,
even those involving insured parties, it could be argued that the
loss of a particular claimant's compensation for injuries is justified
by a general benefit to the public derived from a reduction in the
cost of accidents to insurers and a concomitant reduction in insurance rates.S 8 Even if setoff succeeded in reducing the cost of
accidents to insurers,289 thereby lowering the overall cost of
liability insurance, it still would engender a negative result to the
public by reducing the risk spreading benefits of liability insurance
and placing a greater burden on insureds to bear a portion of their
injuries individually. Thus the risk spreading aspect of insurance, combined with the just compensation goal of tort law,
outweigh any asserted benefit to society from potentially lower
285 See H. WooDs, supra note 1, at §§ 17:2-:4.
M See notes 264-78 supra and accompanying text.
287 See notes 271-72 supra and accompanying text. See also Flynn, Comparative
Negligence: The Debate, 8 TUmAL May-June 1972, at 49, 52; Keeton, supra note 276, at
12-13; Levy, Pure Comparative Negligence: Set-Offs, Multiple Defendants and Loss
Distribution, 11 U.S.F.L. REv. 405, 413 (1976-77).

288 This notion was expressed in a concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Alderman
m the original Florida Supreme Court decision in Bournazian. This decision was withdrawn
and is unpublished but has been reprinted in Walkowiak, supra note 265, at 121-25.
289 See id. at 81-92 for a persuasive argument that the cost of accidents to insurers
would actually increase because of additional sums expended by insurance companies attempting to avoid losses where setoff is allowed.

290 See id. for a discussion of these social costs.
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insurance premiums. Setoff should accordingly not be allowed if

it results in a windfall to insurers at the expense of injured
clanmants.29 1
Since banning setoff completely, as has been done in Oregon
and Rhode Island, also can produce negative results when one or
more injured claimants are insolvent,292 the best approach would
be one of the compromises used elsewhere. One of these compromises was taken by the Florida Supreme Court in Bournazian:
setoff is not allowed where an insurance company's liability is
reduced at the expense of the insured's award. 29 Another approach is the one originally adopted by the UCFA, which allows
setoff in every situation where awards are made to opposing parties but requires insurers to repay insureds any benefit received
from such offset.2 9 A third compromise is the current provision
of the UCFA, which prohibits setoff except where agreed upon
between both parties, but simultaneously provides for the
equivalent of setoff when one of the parties is unable to pay the
full amount of the judgment against him.2- All of these approaches satisfy the just compensation principles of comparative
negligence; one of them should be adopted juclicially or enacted
statutorily along with comparative negligence in Kentucky to avoid
needless litigation attempting to reconcile current rules of setoff
with a new system of apportioning damages with relative fault.
IV. PROBLEMS IN INSTRUCTING JURIES
UNDER MODIFIED CoMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE
Comparative negligence also raises the problem of whether
the jury should be made aware of how much money will actually
See u. at 84 nn.61 & 93.
See notes 277-78 supra and accompanying text.
M See Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So.2d at 473-74. See also notes 270-71
supra and accompanying text. A statutory provision codifying Bournazuma might provide:
A claim and counterclaim shall not be set off, except where both the claimant and
counterclaimant are not covered by liability insurance or where both claimants' insurance
does not completely cover their obligation. The liability of both claimants in excess of
amounts covered by insurance shall be set off against each other.
The present UCFA § 3 produces a result which is for practical purposes identical.
See notes 281-82 supra and accompanying text.
2
See UCFA § 3 (1977). See also notes 279-80 supra and accompanying text.
2s
See UCFA § 3 (1983). See also notes 281-82 supra and accompanying text.
291

292
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be recovered as a result of its particular apportionment of fault.
The issue is particularly significant in states where a plaintiff is
only allowed to recover when his negligence is less than that of
the defendant.9 8 In such jurisdictions when the jury finds each
party equally at fault, as it often may do, particularly if it does
not know the effect of its decision, no damages at all will be awarded to the plaintiff. The issue discussed in this section is whether
juries should be instructed as to the effect of finding a plaintiff
fifty percent or more negligent under this type of modified system
or whether jurors should be required to assign relative negligence
to each party without being informed that their finding could
deprive the plaintiff of any recovery. Similar policy considerations
will apply in resolving the issue under other types of comparative
negligence, although the stakes will not be so high. Resolution of
the issue depends firston whether a general or special form of verdict may be used.
A.

The Form of Verdicts in Kentucky

Under the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure a trial court may
either require general verdicts, special verdicts, or general verdicts with interrogatories.2 7 The purpose of allowing interrogatories to accompany submission of a general verdict is to insure that the jury does not award damages to a party in disregard
of its findings on factual questions.0 8 If it appears from the
296 See note 16 supra for a list of states which have adopted such a system.
297 See CR 49.01 (special verdicts); CR 49.02 (general verdict accompanied by

answers to interrogatories). Although CR 49.01 and CR 49.02 could be interpreted to allow
only special verdicts and general verdicts with interrogatories, general verdicts alone are
also utilized in Kentucky. See 2 J. PALMORE, INSTRUCTIONS TO JUIES IN KENTUCKY, § 13.09
(1977):
Instructions directing the jury to find for one party or another if it is satisfied
from the evidence that certain things are so result in a "general verdict."
In the event the trial court choosesto use a combination of both, as authorized
by CR 49.02, the answers to the interrogatories control over the general verdict to the extent that they are not consistent with it.
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
298 See, e.g., Jones v. Slone, 304 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. 1957). In Jones the jury awarded
approximately $8,000 in a general verdict to a plaintiff in an automobile-pedestrian accident case, but in answer to a written interrogatory found the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. The court held:
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answers to interrogatories that such is the case a trial judge may
either enter judgment in accordance with the answers to interrogatories and ignore the general verdict, instruct the jury to consider its answers further, or order a new trial.m
If modified comparative negligence is adopted in Kentucky
without mandating one specific form of instruction for all tort
litigation, incongruous results would certainly arise under the current rules. General verdicts inherently allow jurors to be informed of the consequences of their findings. The jury is instructed to
find for one party if a certain set of facts exist, but otherwise to
find for the opposing party." Under modified comparative
negligence the jury cannot make such a finding without being informed of the appropriate rules of law regarding the effect of the
relative percentages of negligence assigned each party. 3°0
Therefore, if a general verdict were chosen, with or without the
use of interrogatories, the jury would be informed of the consequences of finding the plaintiff and defendant equally negligent.

Since the legal effect of the jury's special finding was that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent, and since no proper issue of defendant's last
clear chance negligence was presented, the general verdict imposing liability on the defendants was mconsistent with the special finding which absolved
them of liability. In our opimon, under the provision of CR 49.02, the court
should have entered judgment on the special finding for the defendants.
Id. at 920.
M See sd. CR 49.02 states in part:
When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the court shall
direct the entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers.
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is mconsistent with the general verdict, the court may direct the entry of judgment
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or may
return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may
order a new trial.
30 For an example of a model instruction where contributory negligence is a defense,
see 2 J.PALmORE, note 297 supra at § 16.27.
301 For example, the instruction cited in note 300, supra, might be modified to read,
in part: "If you are satisfied from the evidence that D failed to comply with any of these
duties and that such failure was more than fifty percent responsible for causing the accident, you will find for P; otherwise you will find for D."
Unless the jury is told the percentage of negligence that bars the plaintiffs' recovery,
it cannot decide which party shall be granted a general verdict in his or her favor. Even
leaving out the phrase, "than fifty percent," the jury is still aware that if one party is found
more negligent than the other, the more negligent party is not entitled to damages.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72

On the other hand, if the trial judge chose to utilize a special
verdict, the jury would not necessarily be given this information, 3°0 since the fact finding role can be limited to answering
the questions put forth in the interrogatories. Because one of the
major purposes behind the use of special interrogatories is to
alleviate jury bias and sympathy toward parties, it is often argued
that the jury should not be made aware of the consequences of
its findings of fact.m The Kentucky Supreme Court has adopted
this view and held that only issues of fact should be submitted to
the jury on special verdicts.304 Therefore, if comparative
negligence were adopted in Kentucky without explicitly determining the form of verdict to be used in every action, some claimants
could get the benefit of the jury being informed of the consequences
302 CR 49.01 seems to leave the amount of information to be given to the jury open
to the discretion of the trial court: "The court shall give to the jury such written instructions concerning the matte thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make
its findings upon each ssue." Id.
303 See Wasson, Drafting Special Verdict Instructionsand Interrogatores,46 Ky.
BENCH & BAR, Jan. 1982, at 14; Comment, ComparativeNegligence-JuryInstructionsJury Must Be Informed of the Legal Effect of its Answers to Special Verdicts Priorto
Deliberations,Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980), 12 RUT. L.J. 365,
367 & n.16 (1980-81).
304 E.g., Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Ky.
1977). In Robinson, the Court considered the prejudicial effect of the jury being instructed
to award any damages jointly and severally against the defendant and his insurer. Although
under the facts before the Court such instruction was held not to be prejudicial error,
the Court recognized that such questions of law should not be brought before the jury.
"In Anglo-American jurisprudence the function of the jury is to decide contested issues
of fact. In order to perform this function there is no need for jurors to know the legal
effect of their resolution of contested issues of fact." Id. at 204. The Court here cites 2
J. PALMoRE, supra note 297, at § 13.01, where Justice Palmore writes:
In other jurisdictions, as at common law, it may be appropriate to say that
the purpose of instructions is to advise the jury on the law of the case, but
not in this state.
The increasing use of interrogatories instead of general
instructions reflects a realization that the less the jurors know about the law
of the case the easier it is for them to remain strictly within the province
of fact-finding.

(footnotes omitted).
The Court went on to state:
The best way to restrict the jury to its fact finding function and prevent its consideration of immaterial issues of law is for the trial judge to exercise the discretion granted him by CR 49.01 and submit only the contested
issues of fact to the jury for their determination in a special verdict.
557 S.W.2d at 205.
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while others, in the discretion of the trial judge, could have their
verdicts submitted on special interrogatories. The general verdict
would inform the jury that if the plaintiff is fifty percent negligent,
he or she gets no award. The special verdict would only ask for
the assignment of relative fault. Thus a jury could unintentionally deprive the plaintiff of any damages under a special verdict by
simply deciding that the parties were equally to blame. This
mistake could not occur under a general verdict; plaintiffs whose
juries receive this kind of instruction would have a distinct
advantage.m This situation can be avoided if the relative merits
of whether to inform the jury are considered in advance and a
single, consistent rule is adopted along with comparative negligence
in Kentucky.
B.

Approaches in Other Jurisdictions

Since only six comparative negligence states prohibit the use
of special verdicts,3 the most litigated issue regarding jury instructions is whether the jury will be told of the legal consequences
of its findings where a special verdict is used. 07 One approach
taken in some modified comparative negligence jurisdictions requires that jurors not be informed. This rule is currently in effect
only in Arkansas and Wisconsin.m It is justified on the theory
305 See H. WOODS, supra note 1, at § 18:1.
" Maine, Missippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota and Vermont require general verdicts. Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey
and Wisconsin require the use of special verdicts. In Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming special verdicts are allowed in the discretion of the
court but are required if requested by any party. The rest of the jurisdictions leave it to
the discretion of the trial court whether to use a general or special verdict. Id.
307 See generally V ScHwARTZ, supra note 1, at § 17:5; H. WOODS, supra note 1,
at § 18:2.
3M See Argo v. Blackshear, 416 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ark. 1967)("[Wlhen special verdicts are employed, the judge should not give any charge 'beyond what is reasonably
necessary to enable the jury to answer intelligently the questions put to them.' Under that
procedure 'the appeal to the jurors' cruder prejudices will frequently be less effective.' "
(quoting Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1948) which contains
an exhaustive critique of general verdicts)); Fehrman v. Smirl, 121 N.W.2d 255, 265 (Wis.
1963) ("[T]hls instruction is highly objectionable because it tends to inform the jury of the
legal effect of their answer to a question of the special verdict.").
Because of the great number of 50-50 verdicts rendered in Wisconsin allowing no
recovery to the plaintiff, the legislature amended the comparative negligence statute to
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that if a jury does not know the legal effect of its answers to interrogatories the verdict will more likely be untainted by juror
prejudice. 3°9 In recent years this rationale has come under increasing criticism. Three major counterarguments have been expressed: (1) the rule is without foundation since an intelligent juror
will already know the effect of his or her answers on the ultimate
award of damages; (2) when jurors are uninformed they will often
speculate as to the results of their findings and inevitably, in a
certain number of instances, come to incorrect conclusions; the
verdict then does not accurately reflect the jury's intent; and (3)
juries have long had a role in mitigating the harsh effects of legal
doctrines and requiring uninformed special verdicts invades this
"traditional province of the jury "310

In reaction to these criticisms, and in recognition of the inequitable results accruing to the fifty percent negligent plaintiff
who might have recovered had the jury known the rules of law,
every state except Arkansas that precludes a fifty percent negligent
plaintiff from recovering now allows the jury to be informed of
allow a 50 %negligent plaintiff to recover, thus mitigating to a great extent the harshness
of not informing the jury in a special verdict. Smith, ComparativeNegligenceProblems
With the Special Verdict: Informing the Jury of the Legal Effects of Their Answers, I0
LAND & WATER L. BEV. 199, 223-24 (1975). See Flynn, supra note 287, at 49-51.
30 See HEFT & HEFr, supra note 1,at § 8.10. See also Smith, supra note 308, at
204-07; Comment, supra note 303, at 367 n.16.
310 See Smith, supra note 308, at 207-14 for further discussion of these criticisms.
An alarming example of an uninformed jury misapprehending the rules of comparative
negligence is discussed in Comment, supra note 303, at 371 n.43. In Argo v. Blackshear,
416 S.W.2d 314 (Ark. 1967), the jury had found the plaintiff 50% negligent and fixed
damages at $18,000. After being informed by the trial judge that a 50 % negligent plaintiff could not recover any damages, the jury was sent back to fix liability m a general
verdict. The jury returned a general verdict of $18,000 for the plaintiff. The Arkansas
[and ordered] that the special
Supreme Court found "that judgment to be erroneous
verdict of the jury be entered." Id. at 316.
Another variation on the problem of jury speculation about the legal effect of their
answers to interrogatories is that jurors have been found to have unwittingly reduced the
plaintiffs damages by the amount of the negligence attributed to hun or her, not realizing that the judge would make the same reduction again, thus resulting m a "double deduction" for the damages apportioned to the plaintiff's negligence. See Nixon, The Actual
"Leglative Intent"Behind New Hampshire'sComparativeNegligence Statute, 12 N.H.B.J.
17, 27 (1969); Comment, supra note 303, at 372. This problem was recognized by the
Supreme Court of Kansas as a rationale for holding that juries could be informed of the
results of special verdicts. See Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 582 P.2d 271, 281
(Kan. 1978).
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the legal effect of its answer to interrogatories under a special
verdict. 3n Whether imparting such information is mandatory or
permissive is another question. Some courts have held that the trial
judge has some discretion as to whether to inform the jury of the
effect of apportioning fifty percent or more of the negligence to
the plaintiff.312 However, a growing trend is for courts and
legislatures to require that the jury be informed of the results of
3
apportioning negligence under a special verdict. 1
311 See Comment, ComparativeNegligence-jury Instructioison the Legal Effect
of the Jury's Apportionment of Negligence, 1980 UTAH L. Rav 690, 692-94
(1980)(discussmg McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974), overruled, Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1979)).
312 A well developed critique of the rule which prevents informing the jury which
concludes that in most cases a jury should be informed, but that the discretion of the trial
judge may be used where issues are so complex that such instruction might tend to confuse or mislead the jury, appears in Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 687-92 (Idaho 1978).
See also Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 582 P.2d at 280-81; Roman v. Mitchell,
413 A.2d 322, 327 (N.J. 1980)("We conclude that, ordinarily, a jury informed of the legal
effect of its findings as to percentages of negligence in a comparative negligence trial is
better able to fulfill its fact finding function." The court proceeded to hold that an "ultimate
outcome instruction should be given [unless] it would tend to mislead or confuse the jury."
(citing Seppi)); Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d at 596.
MiNN. B. Civ. P. 49.01(2)(1979) should produce the same result:
In actions involving [Minnesota's comparative negligence statute] the court
shall inform the jury of the effect of its answers to the percentage of negligence
question and shall permit counsel to comment thereon, unless the court is
of the opinion that doubtful or unresolved questions of law, or complex issues
of law or fact are involved, which may render such instruction or comment
erroneous, misleading or confusing to the jury.
"13 E.g., Appelgren v. Agri Chem Inc., 562 P.2d 766, 766-67 (Colo. Ct. App.
1977)(interpreting CoLo. Bxv. STAT. § 13-21-111(4) (Supp. 1982)); Resser v. Boise-Cascade
Corp., 587 P.2d 80, 83 (Or. 1978)(interpreting Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.480(2) (1981)); Peair
v. Home Ass'n of Enola Legion No. 751, 430 A.2d 665, 671-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)("We
have concluded that the jury should be informed of the consequence of its apportionment
of negligence. We regard such information as essential if the jury is to be able to apply
the equitable considerations and arrive at the compromises that are an inherent part of
the jury system.").
See WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109(b)(iii) (1983) which provides: "The court may, and when
[i]nform the jury of the consequences of its determinarequested by any party shall:
tion of the percentage of negligence." (emphasis added). The Oregon statute, Or. Rev.
Stat. § 18.480 (1981), requires a special verdict when requested by any party and then
provides: "(2) A jury shall be informed of the legal effect of its answer to the questions
[regarding the amount of damages and the degree of fault]."
In addition, many commentators support informing the jury. See, e.g., V
SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 17.5, at 292-93; Gmnn, The Jury System and Special Verdicts, 2 ST. MARrs L.J. 175, 175 (1970); Ryan, Are Instructions Which Inform the Jury
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If Kentucky adopts a modified form of comparative negligence
which precludes a fifty percent negligent plaintiff from recovery,
the current procedural rules regarding special verdicts should be
overhauled. If the use of a general verdict is retained as an option

available to trial courts, then CR 49.01 should be amended to include a provision similar to the one in effect in Oregon 3 4 mandating that juries shall be informed of the effect of their special
verdicts. Failure to do this would result in unfairness to claimants
who are unsuccessful in convincing the court to use a general

verdict315 Conversely, if in establishing comparative negligence
it is determined that the general verdict should be abandoned,
this incongruity would be removed since under current Kentucky
law the jury should not be informed of the effects of answers under

special verdicts.316 This could be accomplished by enacting
317
legislation requiring special verdicts in all negligence litigation.
of the Effect of Thetr Answers Inimtcal to Justice?, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 400, 402-06; Smith,
supra note 308, at 226-28; Thode, ComparativeNegligence, ContributionAmong TortFeasors,and the Effect of a Release-A Triple Play by the Utah Legtslature, 1973 UTAH
L. REv. 406, 417-18; Comment, supra note 303, at 371-73, 375; Comment, supra note
311, at 693-94.
314 See OR. REV STAT. § 18.480 (see note 322 nfra).
315 See notes 300-04 supra and accompanying text.
316 See, e.g., Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d at 204-05;
see also notes 303-04 supra and accompanying text.
317 Statutes currently in effect in Hawaii and New Jersey unequivocally mandate
this result. See HAwAu REv. STAT. § 663-31(b) (1976) which states:
(b) In any action [in] which [the negligence of parties is compared],
the court, in a nonjury trial, shall make findings of fact or, in a jury trial,
the jury shall return a special verdict which shall state:
(1) The amount of the damages which would have been recoverable
if there had been no contributory negligence; and
(2) The degree of negligence of each party expressed as a percentage.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.2 (West Supp. 1983-84) provides:
In all negligence actions in which the question of liability is in dispute, the
trier of fact shall make the following findings of fact:
a. The amount of damages which would be recoverable by the injured
party regardless of any consideration of negligence, that is, the full value
of the injured party's damages;
b. The extent, in the form of a percentage, of each parties' [sic]
negligence. The percentage of negligence of each party shall be based on
100% and the total of all percentages of negligence of all the parties to a
suit shall be 100%.
c. The judge shall mold the judgment from the finding of fact made
by the trier of fact.
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As discussed above, however, this approach has been severely
criticized ms" and is followed in only a few modified comparative
negligence jurisdictions.319 In adopting a modified system the

Kentucky courts or legislature should recognize the expanding body
of authority allowing or requiring that jurors be informed of the
consequences of their apportionment of negligence in a special
verdict 320 and clearly establish such a rule in Kentucky. If this is
done, there will no longer be any inherent unfairness in allowing
general verdicts as well. Either the current rules could be retained
3
giving courts the option of using a general or special verdict, 21
or, if it is decided that special verdicts are clearly preferable, an
approach could be adopted whereby a special verdict would be
32
required if requested by any party.

318 See notes 310-13 supra and accompanying text.
319 See note 308 supra and accompanying text for cases from those jurisdictions
which support this view.
320 See notes 312-13 supra and accompanying text. One statute that unambiguously effects this result is COLO. REV. STAT. § 121-111(4) (Supp. 1982) which provides:
In a jury trial in any civil action in which contributory negligence is
an issue for determination by the jury, the trial court shall instruct the jury
on the effect of its findings as to the degree of negligence of each party. The
attorneys for each party shall be allowed to argue the effect of the instruction on the facts which are before the jury.
For two statutes not providing for attorneys to argue the effect of the jury's findings,
but still mandating the jury be informed by the court, see O1. REV. STAT. § 18.480(2)
(1981)(text provided m note 322 snfra); WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109(b)(iii) (1983)(text provided in note 313 supra).
321 See note 297 supra and accompanying text.
32 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 18.480 which provides:

(1) When requested by any party the trier of fact shall answer special
questions indicating:
(a) The amount of damages to which a party seeking recovery would
be entitled, assuming that party not to be at fault;
(b) The degree of each party's fault expressed as a percentage of the
total fault attributable to all parties represented in the action.
(2) A jury shall be informed of the legal effect of its answer to the questions listed m subsection (1) of this section.
See also WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1983). The UCFA takes a slightly different approach

by requiring special verdicts except where all the parties agree otherwise. See UCFA §
2(a), 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1983).
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CONCLUSION

Kentucky may soon join the overwhelming national trend of

rejecting the absolute bar of contributory negligence by judicially or statutorily adopting either a pure form or a modified form
of comparative negligence. The purpose here has not been to
evaluate the merits of such a move, but rather to raise important
sub-issues that should be resolved at the time of adoption. The
issues include whether to compare a plaintiff's negligence against
the combined negligence of more than one tortfeasor; whether to
compare a plaintiff's negligence against the negligence of nonparties or settling parties, whether to permit setoff, whether to retain the doctrines of contribution, joint and several liability, and
last clear chance, and whether a jury should be informed of the
effect of its apportionment of negligence. The issues should be
resolved at the time of adoption in order to flesh out at the beginning the theoretical underpinnings for the adoption of comparative
negligence. These underpinnings will govern in large part the outcome of the subsidiary issues. Resolution of the issues at the time
of adoption will also avoid extensive and needless litigation of issues
that can easily be foreseen now. In this way Kentucky, if it adopts
comparative negligence, can profit from the experiences of other
states and turn to its advantage its position as a latecomer among
states following the national trend of adopting comparative
negligence.

